Haywood S. Hansell

Infobox Military Person
name= Haywood Shepherd Hansell, Jr.
born= birth date|1903|9|28
died= death date and age|1988|11|14|1903|9|28
placeofbirth= Fort Monroe, Virginia
placeofdeath= Hilton Head, South Carolina
placeofburial= United States Air Force Academy


caption=
nickname=Possum
allegiance= United States of America
branch=
serviceyears= 1928-1946 1951-1955
rank=
commands= 1st Bomb Wing XXI Bomber Command
unit=
battles= World War II
awards= Distinguished Service Medal Silver Star Legion of Merit Distinguished Flying Cross Air Medal
laterwork=

Haywood Shepherd Hansell Jr., (28 September 1903-14 November 1988) was a general officer in the United States Army Air Forces during World War II, and later the United States Air Force. He became a noted advocate of the doctrine of strategic bombardment, and was one of the chief architects of the concept of daylight precision bombing that governed the use of airpower by the USAAF in the war.

The son of southern aristocrats and scion of a military heritage, Hansell was noted as equally exhibiting the "stereotypical attributes of an engineer" combined with "a sense of romanticism", the former derived from his father and the latter from his mother. [Griffith, Charles (1999). "The Quest: Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in World War II". Air University Press ISBN 1-58566-069-8, pp. 23 and 25.] Hansell played a key and largely unsung role in the strategic planning of air operations by the United States, [Griffith, "The Quest", p.204.] including drafting both strategic air war plans (AWPD-1 and AWPD-42) and the plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive in Europe, obtaining a base of operations for the B-29 Superfortress in the Mariana Islands, [Craven, Wesley Frank; and Cate, James Lea (1953). "The Army Air Forces in World War II Volume V: The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagaski, June 1944 to August 1945", University of Chicago Press, p.31.] and devising the command structure of the Twentieth Air Force, the first global strategic air force and forerunner of the Strategic Air Command. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.144.] He made precision air attack, as both the most humane and militarily effective means of achieving military success, a lifelong personal crusade that eventually became the key tenet of American airpower employment. [Crane, Conrad C. (1993). "Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II". University of Kansas Press. ISBN 0700611037, p.157.] [Griffith, "The Quest", pp.205.]

Hansell also held combat commands during the war, carrying out the very plans and doctrines he helped draft. He pioneered strategic bombardment of both Germany and Japan, [Griffith, "The Quest", p.195.] as commander of the first B-17 Flying Fortress combat wing in Europe, and as the first commander of the B-29 force in the Marianas.

Childhood

Hansell was born in Fort Monroe, Virginia, on 28 September 1903, the son of 1st Lt. (later Colonel) Haywood S. Hansell, an Army surgeon, and Susan Watts Hansell, both considered members of the "southern aristocracy". [Griffith, "The Quest", p.25.] His great-great-grandfather served in the American Revolution, his great-grandfather as an officer in the War of 1812, and his grandfather Andrew Jackson Hansell was an officer in the Confederate States Army from Georgia. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.24.]

Shortly after his birth, the family was stationed in Beijing, China, then in the Philippines, and Hansell learned both Chinese and Spanish at an early age. [Benton, Jeffrey C. (1999). "They Served Here: Thirty-Three Maxwell Men". Air University Press ISBN 1-58566-074-4, p.31.] [Griffith, "The Quest", p.26.] Captain Hansell was next stationed at Fort McPherson, Georgia, in 1913, and then at Fort Benning. His father, a firm disciplinarian, [Griffith, "The Quest", p.26.] sent Hansell to live on a small, family-owned ranch in New Mexico because of a perceived lack of discipline in his schooling. There he learned horsemanship, shooting, and studied with a tutor.

=Education= He entered Sewanee Military Academy, near Chattanooga, Tennessee, in 1916, where he acquired the lifelong nickname "Possum." Although his biographers offer a number of explanations behind the nickname, the most likely is that his facial features gave him the appearance of a possum. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.23, quoting "The Atlanta Journal-Constitution" 6 June 1943.] At Sewanee he developed a fondness for English literature. As a senior Hansell rose to cadet captain and developed a reputation as a martinet. His harshness with the Corps of Cadets, combined with an excessive number of demerits acquired while the school was temporarily quartered in Jacksonville, Florida, following a fire, led to his reduction to cadet private. [Benton, "They Served Here", p.31.] [Griffith, "The Quest", p.28.]

Partly as a result of this humiliation, he declined an appointment to the United States Military Academy to attend the Georgia School of Technology, where he was a member of Sigma Nu. Despite problems understanding differential equations, [Griffith, "The Quest", p.29.] and twice attempting to transfer to another school (which his father would not permit), he overcame his difficulties with complex mathematics and graduated in 1924 with a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering. While at Georgia Tech he participated in varsity football as a walk-on substitute, and boxed. Hansell was awarded Georgia Tech's highest individual recognition, membership in the ANAK Society. [ [http://cyberbuzz.gatech.edu/anak/grads/1920.html ANAK Graduates, 1920-1929] .]

From 1924 to 1928 he attempted without success to find employment as a civil engineer in California, where his father was now stationed. Instead he worked as an apprentice and journeyman boilermaker with the Steel Tank and Pipe Company in Berkeley, California. Advances in aviation in the 1920s led Hansell to undertake a career in aeronautical engineering, and to gain flying experience, he decided to join the United States Army Air Corps.

Personality and family

Short in stature and slightly built, Hansell worked at being an athlete, becoming proficient in tennis, polo, and squash. Socially, he was a noted dancer, and acquired a reputation as "the unofficial poet laureate of the Air Corps." [Benton, "They Served Here", p.32.] He was fond of Gilbert and Sullivan, Shakespeare, and Miguel Cervantes’ "Don Quixote". [Griffith, "The Quest", p.24.] General Ira C. Eaker described him as "nervous and high strung," [Griffith, "The Quest", p.24 and 121.] and one biographer noted several incidents of imperious temper in social situations. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.34.] However his correspondence secretary during World War II, T/Sgt. James Cooper, described him as "pleasant and diplomatic," [Griffith, "The Quest", p.91.] and an aviation historian described him as "a forward-looking optimist with a sense of humor." [Morrison, Wilbur H. (1979). "Point of No Return: The Story of the 20th Air Force". Times Books, ISBN 0-812907-38-9, p.194.]

While stationed at Langley Field, Virginia, Hansell met his wife, Dorothy "Dotta" Rogers, a teacher from Waco, Texas, where they were married in 1932. He fathered three children, son "Tony" (Haywood S. Hansell III, born in 1934), daughter Lucia (1940), and son Dennett (1941). While frequent absences, long working hours, and Hansell’s autocratic nature severely stressed their marriage during World War II, [Griffith, "The Quest", pp.99-100, 131.] they remained married for 56 years until his death in 1988. Hansell's eldest son continued the family military tradition, graduating from the United States Military Academy in 1955, becoming a colonel in the United States Air Force, and marrying the daughter of General Nathan F. Twining. [ [http://nationalaviation.blade6.donet.com/components/content_manager_v02/view_nahf/htdocs/menu_ps.asp?NodeID=1571526623&group_ID=1134656385&Parent_ID=-1 National Aviation Hall of Fame: Nathan F. Twining] ]

Early Air Corps career

Pursuit pilot

On 23 February 1928, he was appointed a flying cadet. He completed primary and basic flying schools at March Field, California, and advanced flight training in pursuit flying at Kelly Field, Texas, graduating on 28 February 1929, and commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army Reserve. He received a regular commission as a second lieutenant, Air Corps, on 2 May 1929. [Fogerty, Robert P. (ed.)(1953). USAF Historical Study 91: "Biographical Data on Air Force General Officers 1917-1952", Vol. I, "A-K".]

Hansell's first duty assignment was with the 2nd Bombardment Group at Langley Field, testing repaired aircraft. In June 1930, he spent three months temporary duty with the 6th Field Artillery at Fort Hoyle, Maryland. In September 1930, he returned to Langley Field and was detached to the Air Corps Tactical School as armament officer. While stationed at Langley, Hansell was involved in two minor accidents in aircraft he was piloting, and also was forced to parachute to safety in early 1931 when his Boeing P-12 stalled during a test flight and went into an unrecoverable spin. He was found at fault for the accident and initially charged $10,000 by the Air Corps for the expense of the aircraft, but the cost was eventually written off. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.32.]

In August 1931, Hansell was transferred to Maxwell Field, Alabama, as assistant operations officer, with flying duties in the 54th School Squadron, transferred to Maxwell from March Field to support the ACTS,(now located at Maxwell). During that tour of duty he met Captain Claire L. Chennault, an instructor at the Tactical School, and joined "The Men on the Flying Trapeze," [Hansell, Haywood S. Jr. (1979). "The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler", Ayer Press, ISBN 0405121784, p.20. Sometimes incorrectly seen as "Three Men on a Flying Trapeze".] an Air Corps aerobatic and demonstration team. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.35. The team in 1932 consisted of Chennault, Hansell, Sgt. William C. "Billy" McDonald, and Sgt. John H. "Luke" Williamson. The two sergeants were reserve officers and later became Flying Tigers.] The team performed at the National Air Races at Cleveland, Ohio, in September 1934. [Benton, "They Served Here", p. 32.] Hansell also worked with Captain Harold L. George, chief of the Tactical School’s bombardment section, where his military interest shifted from pursuits to bombers. The friendship that developed from the working relationship led to George becoming both Hansell’s mentor and patron. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.34.]

Disciple of strategic airpower

Hansell was promoted to first lieutenant on 1 October 1934 and entered the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field as a student in the comprehensive 845-hour, 36-week course, [Finney, Robert T. (1992), "History of the Air Corps Tactical School 1920-1940", Center For Air Force History, Air University, Maxwell AFB., p.8.] studying not only air tactics and airpower theory, which comprised more than half of the curriculum, but also tactics of other services, combined (joint) warfare, armament and gunnery, logistics, navigation and meteorology, staff duties, photography, combat orders, and antiaircraft defenses. [Finney, "History of the Air Corps Tactical School", p.8.] Among his instructors was Captain George, now director of the Department of Air Tactics and Strategy. George's classes were half lecture, half free discussion and conceptualizing, with George or his assistant Capt. Odas Moon expounding theories and having the students critically examine them for flaws and alternative ideas, debates that continued beyond the classroom as well. [Finney, "History of the Air Corps tactical School", p.22.] [Shiner, John F. (1997) "The Coming of the GHQ Air Force", "Winged Shield, Winged Sword, Vol. I 1907-1950", ISBN 0-16-049009-X, p. 111.]

Making up the 59 members of his class were five majors, 40 captains, 13 first lieutenants including himself, and one second lieutenant. In addition to 49 Air Corps officers were four Army officers, one from each of that service's combat arms, two Turkish Army aviators, one Mexican captain, and three Marine Corps aviators, including two future major generals. [Finney, "History of the Air Corps Tactical School", pp. 72-73. The future USMC generals were Lawson Sanderson, who commanded Pappy Boyington's air group in World War II, and future Director of Marine Aviation William J. Wallace.] Among Hansell's Air Corps peers were future generals Muir S. Fairchild, Barney Giles, Laurence S. Kuter, and Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and aviation pioneer Major Vernon Burge, who as a corporal in June 1912 had been the first certified enlisted military pilot. Hansell graduated in June 1935 and was invited to become an instructor at ACTS, one of nine in his class to become ACTS instuctors, and the youngest in its history. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.32.] He served on the faculty from 1935-1938 in the Department of Air Tactic's all-important Air Force Section, first under George, then Major [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/wilson.html Donald Wilson] (another strategic bombing advocate), and lastly Fairchild. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.46.]

Hansell became a member of a group known as the "Bomber Mafia," ACTS instructors who were both outspoken proponents of the doctrine of daylight precision strategic bombardment and advocates for an independent Air Force. [Benton, "They Served Here", p. 32. The Bomber Mafia were George, Wilson, Hansell, Kuter, Fairchild, Robert Olds, Kenneth N. Walker, Robert Webster, and Odas Moon. All but Moon, killed in an air crash in 1937, became generals.] Among the students instructed by Hansell were Ira C. Eaker, Elwood R. Quesada, Nathan F. Twining, Earle E. Partridge, Kenneth Wolfe, [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/and.html Orvil Anderson] , John K. Cannon, and Newton Longfellow, all of whom became general officers and strategic airpower advocates during World War II. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.46.] During this time, Hansell also had a permanent falling out with Chennault after Chennault tried to recruit him to go to China to fly fighters for the Kuomintang government. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.47.]

In September 1938, still a first lieutenant, Hansell entered the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from which he was graduated in June 1939, shortly after promotion to captain. He then was assigned to the Office, Chief of Air Corps (OCAC), under General Henry H. Arnold, working a series of assignments as Arnold assembled an Air Staff to plan and execute a massive expansion of the Air Corps.

After duty in the Public Relations Section, OCAC (1 July to 5 September 1939); he became assistant Executive Officer, OCAC (to Ira Eaker, 6 September to 20 November 1939); created in November 1939 (with Major Thomas D. White) the Intelligence Section, Information Division, OCAC; [Griffith, "The Quest", p.60.] was Officer in Charge, Air Corps Intelligence, Intelligence Section, OCAC (21 November 1939 to 30 June 1940), and finally was Chief, Operations Planning Branch, Foreign Intelligence Section, Intelligence Division, OCAC (1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941). [Hansell, Haywood S. (1986). "The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir". Office of Air Force History, USAF. ISBN 0-912799-39-0, p.25.] [Fogerty, Historical Study 91.] He was promoted to major on 15 March 1941.

In the Air Intelligence Section, Hansell became responsible for setting up strategic air intelligence and analysis operations, creating three sections: analysis of foreign air forces and their doctrines, analysis of airfields worldwide including climate data, and preparation of target selection for major foreign powers. Much of the work was accomplished despite hindrance from the War Department’s G-2 office, which felt that such analysis was not "proper military intelligence." [Griffith, "The Quest", p.61.] Development of sources of information for such analyses also was primitive, and he used his assignment to OPB to recruit a number of civilian economic experts who had recently been commissioned in the military. Hansell also created contacts among Royal Air Force officers stationed in Washington, D.C. to enhance his sources. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.63.]

On 7 July 1941, Hansell went to London, England, as a special observer attached to the military attaché, where he was privy to the inner workings of RAF intelligence and their target folders on the German industrial infrastructure. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.63.] In his memoir, Hansell stated that in the exchange of information, the AAF received nearly a ton of material, shipped back to the United States in a bomber. [Hansell, "The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir", p.24.]

AWPD-1

"See also: "

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"It is far beyond my ability to adequately describe the frustrations, disappointments, fragile hopes, determination, and soaring zeal that were mixed in the cauldron to make AWPD-1 and the plans modifying it. The frantic efforts to meet deadlines, the disagreements, the uphill fight against entrenched and hostile opinion, the dedicated crusade for the new role of air power, the slumbering dread that we might be wrong--that we might persuade our leaders to take a path that would lead to disaster--put a heavy burden on all of us."
source=Haywood S. Hansell - "The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir" [Hansell, "The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir", p.112.] On 12 July 1941, Hansell, just returned from London, was recruited by Harold George to join the Air War Plans Division of the newly-created AAF Air Staff in Washington, D.C., as its Chief of European Branch. [Hansell, Haywood S (1972). "The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler", Higgins-McArthur, p. 6.] [Fogerty, Historical Study 91.] There a strategic planning team of former "bomber mafia" members (himself, George, Kuter, and War Plans Group chief Lt. Col. Kenneth N. Walker), put together an estimate for President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the numbers of aircraft and personnel needed to win a war against the Axis Powers. [Nalty, Bernard C. (1997). "Reaction to the war in Europe", "Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force" Vol. I, ISBN 0-16-049009-X, pp.187.]

Hansell’s responsibility in the plan, called AWPD-1, was information on German targets. Arnold had given George nine days to write the plan, which would be "Annex 2, Air Requirements" to "The Victory Program," a plan of strategic estimates involving the entire U.S. military. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.66.]

Beginning 4 August 1941, they drew up the plan in accordance with strategic policies promulgated earlier that year, outlined in the ABC-1 agreement with the British Commonwealth, and Rainbow 5, the U.S. war plan. The group completed AWPD-1 in the allotted nine days and carefully rehearsed a presentation to the Army General Staff. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.75.] Its forecast figures, despite planning errors from lack of accurate information about weather and the German economic commitment to the war, were within 2 percent of the units and 5.5 percent of the personnel ultimately mobilized, [Griffith, "The Quest", p.78.] and it accurately predicted the time frame when the invasion of Europe by the Allies would take place. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.77.]

Hansell’s contribution to the plan was based on a serious flaw, however. As had most observers, Hansell assumed that the Nazi economy was working at maximum capacity, when in fact it was still at 1938 levels of production, an error that led to an underestimation of the numbers of sorties, bomb tonnage, and time required for bombing to have a decisive effect. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.77.] However, a more significant error in planning, the omission of long range fighter escorts for the bombers, seriously impacted the strategic bombing campaign that later took place. Hansell deeply regretted the omission but noted that it reflected the best available information at the time on fighter aircraft capabilities, which was that any means then available to extend range would also seriously degrade a fighter's air combat performance. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.77.] Hansell wrote, "Failure to see this issue through proved one of the Air Corps Tactical School's major shortcomings." [Hansell,"The Air Plan That Defeated Germany" p.22.]

A lack of knowledge about the capability of radar to create an effective centralized early warning system also contributed to the over-reliance on the self-defense capabilities of bombers. [Greer, Thomas H. (1985). "The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917–1941" USAF Historical Studies No. 89. Office of Air Force History, p.63-65.] However Hansell also argued that ignorance of radar was fortuitous in the long run. [Greer, p.60.] He surmised that had radar been a factor in making doctrine, many theorists would have reasoned that massed defenses would make all strategic air attacks too costly, inhibiting if not entirely suppressing the concepts that proved decisive in World War II and essential to the creation of the United States Air Force. [Tate, Dr. James P. (1998). "The Army and its Air Corps: Army Policy Toward Aviation 1919-1941", Air University Press. P.163.]

World War II service

Planning duties

Following the entry of the United States into World War II, he received a rapid series of promotions, to lieutenant colonel on 5 January 1942, colonel on 1 March 1942, and brigadier general on 10 August 1942. In January 1942, he assisted George and Walker in presenting an organizational plan to the War Department for maintaining the USAAF as part of the Army during World War II, while dividing the Army into three autonomous branches, a reorganization adopted on 9 March 1942. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.83.] On 10 March 1942, Hansell was transferred from AWPD to the Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division of the War Department General Staff and served on the eight-member Joint Strategy Committee as the USAAF representative.

Hansell, at the request of Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, was assigned on 12 July 1942 as Officer in Charge, Air Section, ETOUSA headquarters, [Hansell, "The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir", p.57.] and simultaneously as deputy theater air officer for Maj. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, commander of the Eighth Air Force. His duties were to mold Eisenhower’s opinion on the use of airpower, guided by Spaatz, but there is little indication that he succeeded. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.92.] He also flew combat in a B-17 to gain first-hand experience with daylight precision bombing, attacking the Longueau marshalling yard at Amiens, France, on 20 August 1942. During the mission he developed frostbite on his hands and spent several days recovering from the effects.

On 26 August 1942 he was recalled to USAAF Headquarters to head the planning team for AWPD-42, a revision of the air strategy plan in light of ongoing crises in the war, completing it in 11 days. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.95.] Even though the Navy rejected the plan outright (because it did not participate in its writing) [Watson, George M, Jr. (1997). "Building Air Power", "Winged Shield, Winged Sword", p.234.] and the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not accept it, presidential advisor Harry Hopkins recommended to Roosevelt that he follow the precepts unofficially, which was done. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.99.] Hansell then returned to England, where he was ironically tasked with diverting a large portion of the strategic bomber force to the Twelfth Air Force to support Operation Torch. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.100.]

Combat wing commander in Europe

On 5 December 1942 Hansell received his first combat command, the 3rd Bombardment Wing. Originally one of the three wings of General Headquarters Air Force, cite web | last =Maurer | first =Maurer | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://libraryautomation.com/nymas/usaaf8.html| title = Air Force Combat Units of World War II| format = | work = | publisher = New York Military Affairs Symposium| accessdate = 14 Jul| accessyear = 2008. The 3rd BW was later redesignated the 98th Bomb Wing of the Ninth Air Force.] the 3rd was now part of the Eighth Air Force in England, a B-26 Marauder medium bomber wing training to support the Eighth's heavy bomber mission. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.102.] However on 2 January 1943, he was switched in command to the 1st Bomb Wing, comprising the B-17 groups of VIII Bomber Command, when its commander was transferred to North Africa. [ [http://libraryautomation.com/nymas/usaaf7.html Maurer Mauer "Air Force Combat Units of World War II"] : 1st Bombardment Wing] . Laurence Kuter preceded Hansell in this assignment.] [Griffith, "The Quest", p.103.] Hansell flew his first mission with his new command to Saint-Nazaire, France, the next day and saw first hand the effectiveness of German interceptors, as both wingmen of Hansell's bomber were shot down. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.106.] Later that month, on a 13 January mission to Lille, France, the pilot of the B-17 he flew in was killed in action and the plane nearly shot down on. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.111.] [Freeman, Roger A. "The Mighty Eighth" (1993 edition). ISBN 087938638X, p. 23.]

Hansell commanded the 1st Wing during six critical months when the B-17 force, with only four inexperienced groups, struggled to prove itself. Among the combat doctrines that Hansell developed or approved were use of the defensive combat box formation, detailed mission Standard Operating Procedures, and all aircraft bombing in unison with the lead bomber, all designed to improve bombing accuracy. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.108-109.]

Hansell experienced firsthand the most serious flaws in the daylight precision bombardment theory, that radar early warning and the lack of long-range escort fighters made deep penetration raids by massed bombers too costly to achieve strategic goals until a means of air superiority was attained, and that German industry, rather than being fragile and fixed, proved to be resilient and mobile. [Miller, Donald (2007). "Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany", Simon & Schuster, ISBN 0-74323-544-4, pp. 40 and 144.] These factors later influenced his planning of similar daylight raids against Japan.

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"Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe. Hindsight inevitably suggests that it might have been employed differently or better in some respects. Nevertheless, it was decisive"
source=United States Strategic Bombing Survey cite web | last = | first = | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://www.ibiblio.net/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/ETO-Summary.html#c| title = United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (European War) 30 September 1945| format = | work = | publisher = Hyper-War| accessdate = 14 Jul| accessyear = 2008] On 23 March 1943, he headed up a committee of USAAF and RAF commanders to draw up a plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO).cite book |last= Hansell, Jr|first= Haywood S |authorlink= |coauthors= |editor= |others= |title= The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler |origdate= |origyear= |origmonth= |url= http://www.google.ca/books?vid=ISBN0405121784&id=yIvxVcOTmkEC&pg=PA68&lpg=PA68&ots=3XhvEg-ecm&dq=Haywood+S.+Hansell,+Jr&sig=hmd1T_ogmZzzWpvBajPgLQxe0uc#PPA157,M1|accessdate= 2008-07-14 |edition= |date= 1972 |publisher= Higgins-McArthur/Longino and Porter |location= Atlanta |isbn= 0405121784 |pages= 157-|chapter= |chapterurl= |quote= ] Despite the fact that it altered the target system priorities outlined in AWPD-42, and changed the overall goal of the offensive from knocking Germany out of the war using airpower to one of preparing for the invasion of Europe, Hansell approved the designation of the German aircraft industry as its most important target and the destruction of the German "Luftwaffe" as its top priority. Hansell wrote the final draft of the CBO plan himself. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.117-118.] Although Hansell did not personally participate in later strategic bombing operations against Germany, he had been instrumental in setting in motion the plans and policies that led to the near total destruction of German war industry.

He continued to fly combat missions at the same rate as his group commanders, with his final mission to Antwerp on 4 May 1943, the date that the Joint Chiefs approved the CBO plan. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.118.] On 15 June 1943, noting signs of fatigue and stress, Eaker replaced Hansell in command of the 1st Wing with Brig. Gen. Frank A. Armstrong, and retained him as a staff officer, first as an air planner in the COSSAC (Chief of Staff Supreme Aliied Commander) headquarters until 1 August 1943, when Eisenhower named him deputy commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force. He conjointly was part of the Tactical Air Force Planning Committee, where he oversaw the planning for Operation Tidal Wave, the low-level bombing of oil refineries at Ploieşti, Romania, on 1 August 1943, [Benton, "They Served Here", p. 33.] and recommended approval of the Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.130.] While in Washington on this task, he was "captured" by Arnold and accompanied him to the Quadrant Conference in August, where he personally briefed President Roosevelt on strategic bombing to that point.

B-29 operations planning

In October 1943, General Hansell was appointed chief of the Combined and Joint Staff Division, in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, located at Headquarters USAAF. [Fogerty, Historical Study 91.] As such he became Air Planner on the Joint Planning Staff. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.133.] He immediately had an impact on planning of strategic air attacks on Japan. The JPS draft outline denigrated strategic bombing and declared that an invasion of the home islands was the only means of defeating Japan, but Hansell successfully argued that an invasion should only be a contingency if bombing and a sea blockade of Japan failed to compel a surrender. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.134.]

Hansell accompanied President Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs aboard the USS "Iowa" to the Sextant Conference in November, then was appointed Deputy Chief of the Air Staff in December, working directly with Arnold. His main responsibility was developing the operational plans for the B-29 Superfortress, and he succeeded in gaining three key decisions from the JCS: there would be no diversion of B-29s to General Douglas MacArthur, the schedule for Operation Forager was moved forward more than a year to secure bases for the B-29 in the Mariana Islands, [Craven and Cate, "The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagaski, June 1944 to August 1945", p. 19. The invasion, a pet project of CNO Admiral Ernest J. King, had tentatively been set for early 1946, if at all.] and Twentieth Air Force operations would be entirely independent of control by all three Pacific theater commanders (MacArthur, Chester W. Nimitz, and Joseph Stillwell), reporting directly to the JCS. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.140-143.]

Hansell drew up the tactical doctrine, SOPs, and the table of organization and equipment of the Twentieth Air Force, which was to be commanded by Arnold personally, including use of AAF Air Staff as the staff of the Twentieth. In addition to his own Air Staff duties, Hansell became chief of staff of the Twentieth Air Force on 6 April 1944. When Arnold was incapacitated by a heart attack in May, Hansell acted as "de facto" commander of the Twentieth Air Force. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.146.]

B-29 commander

On 28 August 1944, Arnold made Hansell commander of the XXI Bomber Command, despite misgivings among several senior leaders that while a superb staff officer, he did not have the "temperament" to be a combat commander. Aware of Arnold’s legendary impatience, deputy AAF commander General Barney Giles, who was doubtful that Hansell could accomplish the task given him—setting up an effective air campaign in a brief period using an untried aircraft— obtained a commitment from Arnold that he would not relieve Hansell in only a few months. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.155.] However Hansell’s tenure was threatened from the start because his replacement on the Air Staff, Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad, did not support the concept of daylight precision bombing, [Craven and Cate, "The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagaski, June 1944 to August 1945", p. 104.] instead advocating massive destruction of Japanese cities by firebombing, a tactic that had been advocated in AAF planning circles as early as November 1943. Fire raids on Japan were rapidly gaining widespread acceptance among AAF leaders, including Arnold, both to defeat Japan before an invasion was mounted and to satisfy a perception that the American public wanted revenge for three bloody years of war. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.151, 169, and 182.] Hansell, however, opposed the tactic as both morally repugnant and militarily unnecessary. [Hansell, "The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir", p.270.]

XXI Bomber Command arrived on Saipan on 12 October 1944, and from the start Hansell was beset by a host of serious command problems, the worst of which were continued teething problems with the B-29, tardy delivery of aircraft, aircrews untrained in high altitude formation flying, primitive airfield conditions, lack of an air service command for logistical support, no repair depots, a total absence of target intelligence, stubborn internal resistance to daylight operations by his sole combat wing, subordinates who lobbied for his removal, and Hansell’s inferiority in rank in dealing with other AAF commanders in the theater. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.160-162, 190.] Furthermore, Hansell was forbidden from flying combat missions with his command, possibly because of limited knowledge of the atomic bomb or the perception that he knew the existence of Ultra. [Hansell, "The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir", p.181.] [Griffith, "The Quest", p.172.]

High altitude daylight B-29 raids against the Japanese aircraft industry, commencing 24 November 1944, hampered by bad weather and jet stream winds, [Nalty, Bernard C. (1997). "Victory over Japan", "Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force" Vol. I, ISBN 0-16-049009-X, pp.350.] appeared unproductive. Pressured by Arnold (through Norstad as an intermediary) for results, Hansell subjected his command to intensive corrective measures that caused more resentment among his aircrews. [Morrison, "Point of No Return", p.201.] At the same time commanders in China were strongly recommending removal of XX Bomber Command to another theater as soon as possible, making Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, senior to Hansell, available for command. [Morrison, "Point of No Return", p.150.]

On 6 January 1945, Norstad visited Hansell’s headquarters and abruptly relieved him of command, replacing him with LeMay. Hansell was offered a choice of taking command of XX Bomber Command to transition it to Guam, where he would then become LeMay’s deputy. [Hansell, "The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir", p.214.] Although he and LeMay were friends, LeMay had been Hansell’s subordinate in the 1st Bomb Wing, and Hansell declined the offer. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.189.] While all the command problems factored into his relief, Hansell’s persistence in daylight precision attacks and reluctance to night firebombing, Norstad's view that Hansell was an impediment to instituting incendiary attacks, and their perception that the public relations effort by XXI Bomber Command had been unsatisfactory in preparing the American public for such attacks were the main reasons. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.192-193.]

Hansell left Guam on 21 January 1945. Unknown at the time, his precision daylight attacks had succeeded, both in the immediate and ineffective dispersion of the aircraft engine industry, ["United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War)" Government Printing Office (1946), p.16.] and later in actual destruction on the final raid under his command. [Morrison, "Point of No Return", p.199.] [Nalty, "Victory over Japan", p.351.] A more immediate legacy of his command was his creation, in conjunction with the U.S. Navy, of an effective air-sea rescue system that saved half of all B-29 crews downed at sea in 1945. [Nalty, "Victory over Japan", p.353.]

Impact on strategic doctrine

Hansell outlined an alternate strategy for defeating Japan, one with precision bombing as its basis, that would have defeated Japan in the same time frame historically while obviating the need for area bombing by incendiaries or the atomic bomb. [Hansell, "The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir", pp.268-270] He did not find fault with the incendiary strategy "per se", but rather with the strategy that made it necessary, namely that Japan could not be defeated except by invasion of her home islands. [Hansell, "The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir", pp.264.] Historian Michael Sherry concluded that the case he presented was "powerful". [Sherry, Michael S. (1989). "The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon". Yale University Press. ISBN 0300044143, p.309] Arnold by implication had erred in changing AAF strategy, especially taking into account the "deep and pervasive revulsion among the American people against strategic bombing of all sorts" that resulted. [Hansell, "The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir", p.270] quote box2 |width=30em | bgcolor=#B0C4DE |align=left|halign=left |quote=

"in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bomb had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."
source=United States Strategic Bombing Survey cite web | last = | first = | authorlink = | coauthors = | year = | url = http://www.ibiblio.net/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/PTO-Summary.html#page1| title = United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War) 1 July 1946| format = | work = | publisher = Hyper-War| accessdate = 15 Jul| accessyear = 2008] Historian and Hansell biographer Dr. Charles Griffith concluded that Hansell sacrificed his B-29 command and his later career on principle, adhering to the idea that precision rather than area bombing was not only more moral, but more effective as a strategy. [Griffith, "The Quest", pp.193 and 199.] His dismissal, Griffith argues, was a pivotal event in U.S. airpower doctrine, as the Air Force moved toward a strategy of bombing civilian populations, [Griffith, "The Quest", p.204.] which led to an increasing dependence on the more potentially devastating, inflexible, and "Douhetian" doctrine of nuclear warfare that lasted for decades. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.205.]

Conrad Crane took a somewhat different stance, arguing that despite the firebombing campaign in Japan, American air commanders throughout World War II and thereafter placed an emphasis on precision bombing and avoiding civilian casualties. The use of precision guided weapons in the Gulf War and beyond, he wrote, demonstrated "continued adherence to precision-bombing doctrine and...significant progress toward the ideal...first envisioned" by Hansell and the other Air Corps Tactical School theorists. [Crane, p.157.]

Hansell lectured on the theory of precision air attack throughout his life, particularly at the United States Air Force Academy and the Air War College. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.209.] He authored three books on air strategy: "The Air War Plan That Defeated Hitler" (1972), "The Strategic Air War Against Japan" (1980), and "Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir" (1986). Hansell continued to study modern weapons systems, becoming an advocate of the Strategic Defense Initiative and the B-2 Spirit bomber. However his main focus was in promoting technical advances in precision guided weapons to make precision bombing more practical and therefore more desirable as a military strategy. [Griffith, "The Quest", pp.205.]

Retirement

Following his removal from command on Guam, Hansell at his own request received a training assignment, command of the 38th Flying Training Wing at Williams Field, Arizona, on 15 February 1945. [Morrison, "Point of No Return", p.199.] [Griffith, "The Quest", p.195.] [Fogerty, Historical Study 91, specifically states Williams Field, not Kirtland, as is often seen.] In June 1945, he was transferred to Air Transport Command under his old mentor Lt. Gen. Harold George, commanding the Caribbean Wing at West Palm Beach, Florida, from 30 September 1945 to 14 January 1946, and the North Atlantic Wing at Westover Field, Massachusetts, from 1 July 1946 to 18 August 1946. [Fogerty, Historical Study 91.]

Hansell took early retirement for a loss of hearing disability, retiring in the rank of brigadier general 31 December 1946. He held positions as vice president of Peruvian International Airlines until Peru nationalized the airline in 1949, and vice president of South Atlantic Gas Company from 1949 until his recall to the military.

He was recalled to active duty on 15 July 1951, by Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt S. Vandenberg and assigned as Chief, Military Assistance Program Headquarters, USAF, acting as a senior program manager and advisor to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 5 September 1952, he was promoted to major general. In April 1953, General Hansell was appointed the senior Air Force representative to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group in the Research and Development Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. He retired a second time from the USAF in 1955. [ [http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5693 Air Force Link: Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr.] ]

Hansell worked for General Electric, becoming head of its subsidiary in the Netherlands until 1967, when he retired to Hilton Head, South Carolina. [Griffith, "The Quest", p.208.] Hansell died on 14 November 1988, in Hilton Head, of heart failure and pulmonary edema, as he was preparing to leave for a lecture in Canada. He was interred with full military honors at the Air Force Academy. [ [http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE4DE1E3AF935A25752C1A96E948260 "Haywood Hansell Jr. Dies at 85; Supervised World War II Bombing" "New York Times" obituary, November 16, 1988] .]

Awards and decorations

SOURCE: USAF Historical Study 91, "Biographical Data on Air Force General Officers 1917-1952" (1953) Air Force Historical Research Agency
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*

*

*, (30 June 1943)

* Silver Star, (15 January 1943)

*, (30 June 1943)

*, (16 September 1943)

*, (31 March 1945)

*, (15 March 1946)
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*

*

*

*)

*Order of Merit of the Republic (Italy)

References

* Benton, Jeffrey C. (1999). "They Served Here: Thirty-Three Maxwell Men". Air University Press ISBN 1-58566-074-4
* Griffith, Charles (1999). "The Quest: Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in World War II". Air University Press ISBN 1-58566-069-8
*Hansell, Haywood S. (1986). "The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir". Office of Air Force History, USAF. ISBN 0-912799-39-0
*Morrison, Wilbur H. (1979). "Point of No Return: The Story of the 20th Air Force". Times Books, ISBN 0-812907-38-9

External links

* [http://www.generals.dk/general/Hansell/Haywood_Shepherd_Jr./USA.html Hansell timeline bio at Generals.DK]
* [http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5693 Air Force Link biography: Major General Haywood Hansell, Jr.]