Nuclear doctrine of Pakistan

Military of Pakistan
Joint Services Parade in 2005.
Service branches	Pakistan Army Pakistan Air Force Pakistan Navy (Marines) Pakistan Coast Guard Paramilitary forces of Pakistan Pakistan Strategic Nuclear Command
Headquarters	Rawalpindi
Leadership
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee	General Khalid Shameem Wynne
Secretary of Defence	Lt. Gen. (retired) Syed Athar Ali
Chief of Army Staff Chief of Air Staff Chief of Naval Staff	General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani Air Chief Marshal Rao Q. Suleman Admiral Noman Bashir
Manpower
Military age	16-49 years old[1]
Conscription	None
Available for military service	48,453,305 males, age 16-49 (2010 est.), 44,898,096 females, age 16-49 (2010 est.)
Fit for military service	37,945,440 males, age 16-49 (2010 est.), 37,381,549 females, age 16-49 (2010 est.)
Reaching military age annually	2,237,723 males (2010 est.), 2,104,906 females (2010 est.)
Active personnel	617,000[2] (ranked 7th)
Reserve personnel	513,000
Expenditures
Budget	$6.41 billion (2010-11) (ranked 35th)
Percent of GDP	2.6 % (2008)[3]
Industry
Domestic suppliers	Air Weapons Complex Heavy Industries Taxila Kahuta Research Laboratories Karachi Shipyard National Defence Complex National Engineering and Scientific Commission Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Pakistan Ordnance Factories SATUMA Integrated Defence Systems
Foreign suppliers	United States  China  France  Turkey  Azerbaijan
Annual imports	China, USA
Related articles
History	Military history of Pakistan UN peacekeeping missions Weapons of mass destruction (706)
Ranks	Awards and decorations of the Pakistan military

The nuclear doctrine of Pakistan is the nuclear strategy policy stated by Pakistan to be used in the event of a war, particularly against India.

In the event of a war between Pakistan and India, the Indian numerical superiority in men and conventional arms is likely to overwhelm Pakistan. In a deteriorating military situation, when an Indian conventional attack is likely to break through Pakistani defenses, or has already breached the main defense line causing a major setback to the defense, which cannot be restored by conventional means, the government would be left with no other option except to use nuclear weapons to stabilize the situation. India's superiority in conventional arms and manpower would have to be offset by nuclear weapons. The political will to use nuclear weapons is essential to prevent a conventional armed conflict, which could later on escalate into a nuclear war.

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine therefore is based on the first strike option. In other words, the Pakistani government will use nuclear weapons if attacked by India even if the attack is with conventional weapons. With his experience of a graduated nuclear response, Professor Stephen P. Cohen feels that Pakistan would use what he calls an 'option-enhancing policy'. This would entail a stage-by-stage approach in which the nuclear threat is increased at each step to deter India from attacking. These stages are as follows:

1. A public or private warning.
2. demonstration explosion of a small nuclear weapon on Pakistani soil.
3. The use of (a) nuclear weapon(s) on Pakistani soil against Indian attacking forces.
4. The use of (a) nuclear weapon(s) against critical but purely military targets on Indian soil, probably in thinly populated areas in the desert or semi-desert, causing the least collateral damage.

Some weapon systems would be in reserve for the counter-value role. These weapons would be safe from Indian attack as some would be airborne while the ground based ones are mobile and could be moved around the country.

Alternate doctrine

Starkly contrasting India, Pakistan has adopted a policy of nuclear first-use. In 1998, Pakistan's foreign secretary Shamsad Ahmed mentioned that Pakistan's policy implies that it will not only use nuclear weapons in a retaliatory strike, it is also ready to take the lead and use nuclear weapons first to counter Indian conventional aggression.

Two major factors have prompted Islamabad to adopt such a posture. First, a first-strike nuclear force is affordable in financial terms and is less cumbersome to build. As first-use policy purports a small nuclear arsenal, it is easier to manage once it is built and its command and control system is less complex compared to a second-strike nuclear force. This is also consistent with Pakistan's policy of minimum nuclear deterrence, another key feature of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine. Second, India's conventional power far outweigh Pakistan's; so a first-use policy is an 'equaliser' of this imbalance. Islamabad's policy in this context is reminiscent of NATO's adoption of a first-use policy during the Cold War period against conventionally superior Warsaw Pact forces in the European theatre. Pakistan's structural vulnerabilities - lack of go-strategic depth, proximity of missile and air bases and storage facilities to international borders and within the range of an Indian pre-emptive conventional strike, further exacerbate Pakistan's military inferiority, which reinforces the Pakistani rationale to adopt a first-use policy.

Despite its adoption of a first-use policy, Islamabad is yet to clearly state the circumstances or the 'red-lines' that will prompt a Pakistani first-use of nuclear weapons. According to a retired Pakistan Air Force officer, for example, Islamabad will use nuclear weapons first under the following conditions:

1. Penetration of Indian forces beyond a certain defined line or crossing of a river.
2. Imminent capture of an important Pakistani city like Lahore, Sialkot or the capital city Islamabad
3. Destruction of Pakistan's conventional armed forces or other assets beyond an unacceptable level. This includes if the Pakistan Army is unable to halt an invasion or can no longer conduct offensive operations to push the invaders back to the international border. Also, if the Pakistan Air Force is destroyed or crippled to an extent where it can no longer conduct aerial operations such as no longer maintaining air superiority, cannot strike enemy targets or can no longer be able to provide air cover to the troops on the ground.
4. An attack on any of Pakistan's strategic targets such as dams, bridges, military industries or nuclear installations like Tarbela, Mangla, Kahuta, Chashma, Taxila etc.
5. Imposition of a naval blockade on Pakistan to an extent that it strangulates the continued transportation of vital supplies and adversely affects the war-waging stamina of the country. Pakistan's southern port cities of Karachi and Gwadar are blockaded and the Pakistan Navy is either destroyed to crippled to an extent where it cannot break the blockade or can no longer destroy enemy warships or conduct sea operations.
6. Indian crossing of the Line of Control to a level that it threatens Pakistan's control over Pakistani-Administered Kashmir.
7. Chemical or Biological weapons are used against Pakistan.^[4]

References

1. ^ Persons of 16 years of age with parental permission.^{[citation needed]}
2. ^ The Military Balance 2010, p. 367, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London, 2010).
3. ^ The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
4. ^ Chakma, Bhumitra, Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control system; Dilemmas of Small Nuclear Forces in the Second Atomic Age.

External links

• Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine