T-26

Infobox Weapon
name= T-26


caption= Finnish T-26 at the Parola Tank Museum
origin= Soviet Union
type= Light Infantry tank
is_artillery=
is_vehicle= yes
is_UK= yes
service= 1931–45, –1953 in Spain
used_by= Soviet Union, Turkey, Afghanistan, Spain, China, Finland, Germany
wars= Spanish Civil War, Winter War, Soviet–Japanese Border Wars, World War II
designer= Carden–Loyd, OKMO
design_date= 1929
manufacturer= Bolshevik Factory, Kirov Factory
unit_cost=
production_date= 1931–41
number= 12,123 of all variants
variants=
spec_label= T-26 Model 1933 [Zaloga 1984, p 116.]
weight= 9.4 tonnes
length= 4.88 m
width= 2.41 m
height= 2.41 m
crew= 3
elevation=
traverse=
armour= 6–25 mm
primary_armament= 45 mm gun M1932 20-K (100 rds.)
secondary_armament= 7.62 mm DT machine gun (2,961 rds.)
engine= Gasoline T-26
engine_power= 91 hp (67 kW)
pw_ratio= 9.6 hp/tonne
transmission=
suspension= Leaf spring
clearance=
fuel_capacity= 258 l
vehicle_range= 175 km
speed= 28 km/h

The T-26 was a light tank used by the Soviet Union from the 1930s until World War II. It was based on the British Vickers 6-Ton tank and widely considered one of the most successful designs of the 1930s. [Franco, "El Tanque de la Guerra Civil Española", p. 74]

The T-26 made-up the majority of the Red Army's armour force until late 1941, and saw a long history in the armed forces of various different nations around the world. For almost a decade the T-26 proved to be one of the best tanks in production, with a total of around 12,000 units produced.Candil, p. 34] Success and failure in the Spanish Civil War, where it served as the most widely used tank, ultimately played a major role in influencing the Soviet doctrine of tank warfare in the late 1930s. The T-26 participated in German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 as one of the most numerous tanks in service, [Baryatinskiy, pp. 34-35] contributing to the defense of the Soviet Union.

Although the T-26's reputation was marred by its abysmal performance during World War II, it was nevertheless the most important tank of the Spanish Civil War and played major roles during the Winter War and the Battle of Khalkhin Gol in 1939. Between its introduction and its retirement, the T-26 saw a great deal of modernization efforts between 1932 and 1941.

Design

By 1933, the Red Army fielded at least six different types of tanks to fulfill Deputy Commissar for Defence Mikhail Tukhachevsky's view of mechanization for his theory of deep operations. These models included the T-26 for armour attachments to infantry divisions, the BT-5 for mechanized cavalry, the T-35 as a heavy breakthrough tank and the T-37/T-38 as an amphibious reconnaissance vehicle. [Candil (1999), p. 34 "See also:" House, "Towards Combined Arms Warfare". Heinz Guderian's "Achtun-Panzer!" also related Soviet inter-war theory, but he mentions that the T-26 was armed with a 57 mm gun - this is incorrect.] By 1940, the T-26 was the most widely produced of all these tanks. [Mikhail Baryatinskiy's "Light Tanks" offers production numbers for the BT-5, T-37, T-38 and T-26. At least, 12,000 T-26s were accepted into service with the Red Army ("see table above"), while around 7,500 BT tanks of all types were active in the Red Army prior to the Second World War. By 1939 around 4,000 T-37s and T-38s had been accepted into service by the Red Army.]

The T-26 was designed to replace the obsolescent T-18, also called MS-1. It was designed in 1929, when several Soviet military officials travelled to Western Europe to choose a new tank model for indigenous production and upgrading. [Baryatinskiy, p. 20–21] Originally, the Soviet Experimental Design Department attempted to produce two "pirated" prototypes of the Vickers Six-Ton—the T-19 and T-20 [Miller, p. 216] — but neither prototype fulfilled the role required by the Red Army. Eventually the Soviets opted to simply purchase the production license. [García, p. 319] Following acquisition of the production license, production of the T-26A, a copy of the Vickers Six-Ton model A, began in 1931. [Franco (2006), p. 74. Baryatinskiy, p. 21 for information on production factories. Production was to originally begin at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant and later continue in the new Stalingrad factory.]

The Soviets did not simply replicate the Vickers Six-Ton: [Baryatinskiy, p. 20] Like its British counterpart, the T-26A had a twin-turret configuration and was designed to carry two machine guns—one in each turret. The major differences between the Soviet T-26A and the British Six-Ton were the rectangular firing ports for Degtyarev machine guns, as opposed to the round ports used by the original design.Baryatinskiy, p. 24] After problems experienced with precipitation and snow getting into the engine compartment, a special bonnet was installed after March 1932, and was later made integral with the design of the air intake unit. The tank was also fitted with a higher turret with an observation post, while the driver was given a vision port. Around 1,627 T-26A tanks with twin turrets were produced between 1931 and 1933, and 450 were armed with the 37 mm PS-1. [Baryatinskiy, p. 27] However, in 1933 the Soviets unveiled the T-26B, with a single cylindrical turret which carried a single 37 mm cannon and a single 7.62 mm machine gun.Franco, p. 74] Ultimately, this 37 mm primary cannon was replaced by the better known 45 mm, which was based on the German Pak 35/36 cannon acquired in 1930. The 45 mm gun would be improved when the original 45 mm 19K anti-tank gun, [Redesignated the 20K with the whole assembly] developed at Plant No. 8, was replaced in 1935 by the 45 mm model 1934. The semi-automatic mechanism of the 19K was exchanged by an inertial operating mechanism. [Baryatinskiy, p. 29] The T-26 could carry up to three secondary Degtyarev 7.62 mm machine guns, in coaxial, rear, and antiaircraft mounts. The majority of T-26 built were of the T-26B model, otherwise known as the T-26 Model 1933. The original purpose of the upgraded firepower was to increase lethal range to defeat dedicated anti-tank teams, as the original machine gun ordnance was found insufficient. [Baryatinskiy, p. 25]

Perhaps the single largest advantage the T-26B had over the Panzer I and CV-33/35 was the 45 mm cannon. Although Panzer Is were able to perforate the T-26B's front armour plate during the first clashes of the Spanish Civil War using armour piercing 7.92 mm ammunition, it was only able to do this at under 150 m. Republican and Soviet tank crews countered this by engaging at ranges of up to 1,000 m.Candil, p. 36] This advantage in engagement range outweighed the fact that all tanks had similar protection levels at their thickest point, and the Italian and German tanks had slightly better mobility. It allowed the T-26B unrestricted dominance during the Spanish Civil War. The relatively high power of the 45 mm gun was one of the reasons Spanish nationalist engineers attempted to upgrade the gun of the Panzer I, (although, as stated, this would prove ultimately unsuccessful). The power of the Soviet 45 mm gun was matched by the accuracy of the gun sights, which allowed for engagement ranges of 3,000 m. Nationalist anti-tank gunners using the Pak 37 could not accurately hit at beyond 900 m, and although the Spanish did use the German 88 mm anti-aircraft cannon in the anti-tank role, [A role which would make the gun infamous during the Second World War.] they were not supplied in large enough numbers to make an impact.

The Nationalist army, under Francisco Franco, never truly found a solution to defeating the T-26B, given the inferiority of armor supplied by his Italian and German allies. Consequently, some of the most innovative answers to the T-26 were developed by Spanish infantry. For example, the molotov cocktail would be invented during the Spanish Civil War, as well as the satchel charge. [Weeks, "Men Against Tanks", p. 31–32] Despite the unprecedented superiority of the T-26B its susceptibility to infantry and to infantry guns made a profound impact on Soviet military thinkers of the time. [For a brief summary of anti-tank tactics during the Spanish Civil War see: Weeks, "Men Against Tanks"]

Inter-war years

In 1938 the T-26B saw an additional upgrade to the C version which had its front armour plate thickened to 25 mm of steel. This still proved to be insufficient against better anti-tank weapons, and the tank was upgraded one more time. This time it manifested itself as the T-26S and was completed after the T-26 performed ineffectually against Japanese light tanks during the undeclared war between Japan and the Soviet Union in Mongolia. After the Spanish Civil War the T-26 was used in large numbers during the Soviet-Finnish Winter War in 1939. The poorly coordinated Soviet offensive ended in large numbers of the tanks utilized being knocked out by Finnish anti-tank weapons and more than 40 captured. Even more T-26 tanks would be captured during the offensive phase of the Continuation War. The Finns also rearmed their Vickers 6-Ton tanks with the Soviet 45 mm gun and these would be re-designated as T-26Es and used by the Finnish Army during the Continuation War. 75 T-26s and 19 rebuilt Vickers tanks continued in service after the end of the Second World War. [Muikku, "Suomalaiset Panssarivaunut 1918–1997", p. 191] The debacle in Finland persuaded the Soviet Union to reassess the value of armour in an offensive war, but also made public serious weaknesses in the Red Army's armoured divisions which were not corrected until after the large-scale losses of 1941 against invading German armour. ["See": Glantz, "Stumbling Colossus", p. 88–89 for an analysis of the Red Army in Finland. Regarding information on the armoured/mechanized divisions/corps of the Red Army "see": House, "Towards Combined Arms in Warfare.]

Prior to the Second World War the T-26 saw one last successful encounter against Japanese tanks at Khalkhin Gol, under the command of Soviet General Georgi Zhukov. Zhukov's offensive included 469 light tanks, most of which were T-26s. Infantry during the offensive rode on the hulls of armour and armoured cars various times to reduce the time it took to close with the enemy, which aided in co-operation between armour and infantry.House, p. 69] Although the offensive against Japanese forces infiltrating Mongolia was an unexpected success following poor-performance by the Red Army in Poland [Glantz, "Stumbling Colossus", p. 87; Glantz mentions that the Red Army 'muddled through the operation' due to logistical, morale and command and control problems. He references M.V. Zakharov in "General'nyi shtab v predvoennye gody (The General Staff in the prewar years), p. 163–167.] and major set-backs in Finland, [Woodel, p. 55–56] despite the ultimate Soviet victories in both cases, it became apparent that the T-26 was obsolete against newer tanks, including the Japanese Type 97 Chi-Ha, the older Type 89 Chi-Ro and German tanks which were showcased in Poland, such as the Panzer III and Panzer IV. One of the largest faults of the tank was the riveted armour, which was found to be too weak to protect against direct hits. This would be corrected on the T-26S variant which replaced the riveted front plate with a thicker welded plate. [ WWII Vehicles.com. [http://www.wwiivehicles.com/ussr/tanks_light/t26.html T-26 Light Tank] Dead link|url=http://www.wwiivehicles.com/ussr/tanks_light/t26.html|date=October 2008] The T-26S had an increase in armour thickness from 16 mm to a maximum of 25 mm at 55 degrees on the upper glacis plate. The turret featured an increase to 20 mm at 45 degrees sloping. [http://www.irvania.com/downloads/TBOTRus1.pdf Book of Tanks: Russian/Soviet (pdf)] ] Unlike the T-26B in Spain, the T-26S used a maximum of two machine guns, one of which was mounted in the rear.

Soviet military developments

An anonymous British attaché to the Spanish Republic claimed, "The greatest caution must be used in deducing general lessons from this war: a little adroitness and it will be possible to use it to “prove” any preconceived theory."Zaloga, [http://libraryautomation.com/nymas/soviet_tank_operations_in_the_sp.htm"Soviet Tank Operations"] ] His remarks are drawn into context when taking into consideration Soviet tank developments during and after the Spanish Civil War.

The 1937 purges of the Red Army claimed the life of General Tukhachevsky, one of the most important theorists of armoured warfare of the inter-war period. With no major proponents of Tukhachevsky's theories in a position to implement them, the advances he had made in armoured strategy were lost.Fact|date=April 2007 Based on observations from the Spanish Civil War it was decided that armour was too unwieldy to successfully interact and operate with infantry. Tanks moved too quickly for the infantry to accompany, and there was no clear communications doctrine between tanks and infantry. Furthermore, some infantry refused to accompany tanks and there was no clear training of Spanish soldiers to correct these tactical inefficiencies. Republican tanks frequently fell to anti-tank gunnery, due to the lack of infantry support, as there was no infantry to locate and knock out enemy anti-tank positions that were hidden from the armour. Republican tanks rarely operated on the move in Spain since the radios often broke down, and the majority of tanks simply didn't have radios. Due to these operational difficulties, many old-school Soviet military leaders believed that tanks were not a worthwhile weapon of war, and so the role of the tank was played down considerably.

It was only after the quick German success in Poland contrasted with Soviet set-backs in the same country and the debacle in Finland, that Stavka and Stalin were persuaded to introduce the T-34 into production to replace the light tanks, and to reform large mechanized formations. These provisions were both too little and too late, although not all developments between April 1, 1939, and June 22, 1941, were negative; a commission under the leadership of Soviet General Grigory Kulik oversaw a new reorganization of the Soviet armoured force in December 1939. It was found that the large mechanized corps which had been proposed by Tukhachevsky was too unwieldy and hard to coordinate due to the sheer bulk of armour [House, p. 38–39] and the commission emphasized using tanks for infantry support, as opposed to using them in stand-alone armoured divisions. Therefore, Kulik planned for fifteen new motorized divisions to replace the Soviet mechanized corps. By 1940, four of the fifteen had been created.

Impressed by the German campaign of 1940 against France, the Soviet NKO changed their original plans however and ordered the creation of nine mechanized corps on July 6, 1940. Between February and March 1941 another twenty would be ordered, and all larger than those intended by Tukhachevsky. Although, on paper, by 1941 the Red Army's 29 mechanized corps had no less than 29,899 tanks, this proved to be a hopelessly inaccurate account.House, p. 96] There were actually only 17,000 tanks available at the time, meaning several of the new mechanized corps were under-strength, and the sheer majority of these were older, less capable designs, including over 10,000 T-26 tanks.Baryatinskiy, p. 35] By June 22, 1941 there were only 1,475 T-34s and KV series tanks available to the Red Army, and these were too dispersed along the front to provide enough mass for even local success. For example, the 3rd Mechanized Corps in Lithuania was formed up of a total of 460 tanks, 109 of these were newer KV-1s and T-34s. This division proved to be one of the lucky few with a substantial number of newer tanks. However, the whole 4th Army was composed of 520 tanks, all of which were the older T-26, compared to its authorized strength of 1,031 newer medium tanks. [Glantz, p. 35] This problem was universal throughout the Red Army's available armour. This fact played a crucial role in the defeats of the Red Army in 1941 at the hands of the German Armed Forces. [Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, p. 117]

Second World War

The Winter War

During the Soviet-Finnish Winter War, the Soviets initially employed 2,514 tanks, a number which increased to 6,541 by the end of the war. [Kantakoski, "Punaiset panssarit - Puna-armeijan panssarijoukot 1918–1945", p. 260] Apart from the pure tank brigades and regiments, which mainly consisted of heavy tanks, and lighter tanks like T-26s and of the BT-type, the Soviet infantry divisions were also equipped with infantry support tanks, mostly T-26s. Thus, the T-26 would become the most common tank of the war. [Kantakoski, p. 260] The Finns on the other hand lacked modern tanks and had only a limited number of effective 37 mm AT-guns to defend themselves against such. [Appel, "Finland i krig 1939–1940", pp. 85–86] [Kantakoski, p. 262]

Heavier Soviet tanks, like the T-28 easily broke through the Finnish defence on the open fields at Summa on the Karelian Isthmus, as the Finns lacked effective means of stopping them. However, lighter tanks and supporting infantry were often stopped by determined defences and therefore the heavy tank units lacked support and were forced to withdraw. [Appel, pp. 119–120]

The Finnish terrain in Karelia proved unsuitable for Soviet tank tactics. [Jorgensen, "Strategy and Tactics: Tank Warfare", pp. 38–39. Interestingly, this source also says that the terrain was unsatisfactory for the use of Finland's Vickers Six-Ton tanks - as this article states, the T-26 is based on the British Vickers Six-Ton.] Together with the poor military leadership at the time, the Soviets suffered from horrendous casualties as a result. Having to stick to available roads, the stretched out columns were vulnerable to the Finnish motti tactics. The smaller and more mobile Finnish units divided the Soviet units and defeated them one by one. The Finns simply chose where and when to fight and therefore concentrated their strengths to gain local tactical superiority, while smaller units guarded other pockets. The lack of anti-tank guns forced the Finnish defence to improvise means in order to stop Soviet armour. Often, Soviet tank crews were isolated until the crews were forced to try escaping by foot through the forests. Other times, the tanks were immobilized by Molotov cocktails or by knocking-out their tracks by using mines or simply by blocking the sprocket with a block of wood. This enabled the Finns to capture large amount of armoured vehicles and weapons almost intact - a welcomed gift for the under-armed Finnish military. [Appel, p. 163]

At the motti battle of Tolvajärvi, the Finns managed to capture 60 T-26s, 3 armoured cars and a number of Komsomolets armoured tractors in this way. [Kantakoski, pp. 271–272 and Jorgensen, "Strategy and Tactics: Tank Warfare", p. 39] A further 132 tanks and 12 armoured cars were captured at Lemetti. Given that the encircled unit was mostly motorized the tanks captured were mostly BT-type and turned out to be almost completely intact. [Kantakoski, pp. 274–277]

At the battles of Suomussalmi and Raate, the Soviet 163rd and 44th infantry divisions lost all of their armour consisting of 86 tanks. [Hughes-Wilson, "Snow and Slaughter at Suomussalmi", pp. 49–50] The Finns took more than 69 T-26 tanks and 10 armoured cars, a number equal to the entire pre-war Finnish armoured force. Far more important was the large amount of effective 45 mm anti-tank guns captured during these battles, which enabled the Finns to defend against armoured vehicles more effectively. [Kantakoski, pp. 281–283] At Pelkosenniemi and Ilomantsi the Finns would capture a further 10 tanks. [Kantakoski, p. 286]

Altogether, the Finns captured around 288 tanks and thirty-five armoured cars during the battles; most tanks turned out to be T-26s, BT-5s and BT-7s. 167 captured armoured vehicles were rebuilt for use with Finnish tank units.Muikku, p. 18] Of these, three OT-26s and fifty T-26s were later repaired and taken into Finnish service. According to new Russian sources, the Soviet Red Army lost 3,179 tanks during the Winter War - 1,904 tanks as combat losses and 1,275 tanks as non-combat technical losses [irrecoverable losses from them were 358 tanks, others were repaired] .

In 1939, the Finnish armoured forces consisted of around thirty-two obsolete Renault FT-17 tanks, some Vickers-Carden-Lloyd Mk. IVs and Model 33s, which were equipped with machine guns, and 26 Vickers Armstrongs 6-ton tanks. The latter had been re-equipped with 37 mm Bofors AT-guns after the outbreak of the war. Only 13 of these tanks managed to get to the front in time to participate in the battles. [Kantakoski, p. 257]

At the Battle of Honkaniemi on February 26, 1940, the Finns employed their Vickers tanks for the first - and only - time against Soviet armour during the Winter War. The battle ended with Finnish defeat. Of the thirteen available Finnish Vickers 6-ton tanks only six were in fighting condition and able to participate in the first assault on the Soviet lines - to make matters worse, one of the tanks was forced to stop, unable to cross a wide trench. The remaining five continued onwards a few hundred meters but ran into dozens of Soviet tanks in the village of Honkaniemi. The Finnish tanks managed to knock out three Soviet tanks but were soon themselves knocked-out. [Kantakoski, p. 267] In the skirmishes that followed, the Finns lost two more Vickers tanks.

The German invasion of the Soviet Union

The T-26 formed the backbone of the Red Army's tank force during the first months of the German invasion of the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The Red Army was equipped with 10,268 T-26 tanks of all models on June 1, 1941. This and the lack of coordination between different units of the Red Army influenced a very poor performance of the Red Army against the Germans between June and August 1941. Even in instances where Soviet commanders showed initiative, such as Soviet General Kirponos counterstroke in the Southwest, Soviet forces were simply not coordinated enough to stall the German advance, nor were their tanks comparable to the newer generation of German armour, such as the Panzer III and Panzer IV. [Glantz and House, p. 54] By the end of fighting along the central axis in August 1941, in preparation for the end of German operations around Kiev and Leningrad, the majority of the Red Army's armour had been destroyed or captured. Although the Germans themselves fielded various obsolete designs, such as the Panzer I and Panzer II, their heavier armour was packed together to provide enough mass to punch through Soviet front lines and exploit any breakthroughs achieved. In instances where Soviet heavy and medium armour was available the German offensive was many times stalled, as in the Soviet counterattack in front of Raseiniai, Lithuania, on June 24, 1941, which was able to overrun an advance reconnaissance detachment of the German 6th Panzer Division, forcing the divergence of the 1st Panzer Division and stalling the offensive for a day. [Raus, p. 34, Zaloga & Grandsen (1981), p. 10–12] By the end of the year most surviving units of the T-26 had been reverted to other duties, including logistics, and were often used as chassis for new tank surrogates.

However, despite the fact that the majority of the Red Army's T-26 tanks had been destroyed in the first months of the war with the Third Reich, T-26 tanks still saw combat around Leningrad until at least 1944. There would also be T-26 tanks present during Operation August Storm, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in August 1945. In this operation the T-26 tank aided in the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army. [Information dealing with combat operations of the T-26 after 1941 is reviewed briefly in Baryatinskiy, p. 35]

Many T-26s were captured by the Germans during the offensive. Most of the captured tanks were captured without serious damage, a testament to existent mechanical problems within the tank. Under German usage the T-26 was found to have severe clutch problems, a hot steering apparatus and seized bearings. Several T-26Bs were used by the German 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" as renamed "Mistbiene" tanks, or 'droneflies'. The T-26B, redesignated as the T-26B 738(r.) was used extensively by the German Army. Many T-26Cs were also used on the Eastern Front during the war by the Germans. Later in the war, several T-26s of all versions were abandoned by their new German owners due to the same severe mechanical defects which had caused their original capture. Many light tanks were used as tractors to carry Pak guns and artillery guns, and there were also instances where German T-26s were used to support infantry operations as well—these vehicles were renamed the T-26 C740(r). [For information dealing with captured Soviet tanks used by the German Army see: Regenberg, p. 4–10]

There would be several replacement programs for the T-26 throughout the Second World War. The original replacement light tank would be the T-50, adopted for the Red Army in February 1941. Despite the fact that mass production was to start in the Leningrad Plant No. 174 on January 1, 1941 the sophisticated T-50 saw several production problems. Ultimately 50 T-50 tanks were assembled in Leningrad prior to the plant's removal and movement to Omsk in August 1941. Efforts to renew production in Moscow failed, although Plant No. 174 in Omsk managed to produce another 15 tanks before production was switched to T-34s only. [Baryatinskiy, p. 68–70] The T-50's production failure at Moscow Plant No. 37 led to the design of the T-60 light tank, an austere version of the T-50 heavily based on the T-40 amphibious tank. Between July 1941 and early 1943, 5,839 T-60s were delivered to the Red Army, of which 5,796 were accepted into active service. [Baryatinskiy, p. 72–84] Yet another replacement was manifested as the T-70 tank which saw its beginnings in October 1941 as a project of the GAZ plant design bureau. The T-70 was largely based on the T-60 to keep the two as similar as possible. Later, the T-70 would see a modernization effort, known as the T-70M. 8,226 T-70s of all types would be constructed. [Baryatinskiy, p. 85–95] The final replacement light tank was known as the T-80 light tank which was a new manifestation of the T-70 with a thickened armor plate and a three-man crew. Eighty-five T-80s were produced between late 1942 and early 1943. [Baryatinskiy, p. 95]

Outside the Red Army

During the Continuation War, the Finns captured a further 76 T-26 tanks, besides a large number of other types. Of these, 35 were fully repaired and sent to the armoured units, 21 were stored for later refurbishment, while 20 were scrapped. The T-26 remained the main tank of the Finnish Armoured Division throughout the war, although it was started to be replaced by German StuG IIIs from 1943. As noted above, 94 T-26 tanks remained in service with the Finnish Army by 1945. Peak numbers in Finnish service occurred during the summer of 1944, when the Finns kept up to 126 various T-26s, including 22 T-26Es, 2 T-26 m 1931s, 1 OT-26, 63 T-26 m 1933s, 32 T-26 m 1937s and 1939s, and 1 T-26 T. Some of these tanks were kept as training tanks until 1959, when they were finally phased out and replaced by newer British and Soviet tanks. [Muikku, p. 191]

Additionally, Franco's Spain kept captured T-26Bs as the backbone of the new Spanish armoured division, the Brunete. After the end of the Spanish Civil War, Spain received additional T-26 tanks from France which had been taken from retreating Popular forces and interned in French warehouses. In 1942 the Spanish Army had 139 T-26Bs in service. [García, p. 328] After the end of the Second World War Spain had at least 116 T-26Bs in active service, along with 20 Panzer IVs, 93 Panzer Is, 10 StuG IIIs, 60 CV-33s and another 80 assorted machine gun carriers. [García and Franco, "La Brunete", p. 31] The T-26s were organized into two battalions of 30 tanks each, along with a single Panzer I command tank, six other Panzer I Ausf. As and a CV-33 for reconnaissance in each battalion. The T-26 were not be replaced until 1953 when Spain and the United States signed an agreement for open shipments of new military matériel to Spain. The first twelve M47 Patton tanks, dedicated to replace the T-26, arrived at Cartagena in February 1954. [Manrique and Franco, "La Brunete: Primera Parte", p. 31]

60 T-26 light tanks were sold to Turkey in 1935, along with five T-27 tankettes, about 60 BA-6 armoured cars, and two T-28 medium tanks, to form the 1st Tank Regiment of the 2nd Cavalry Division at Luleburgaz. [Zaloga 1984, p 108] An unknown number, consisting of at least 2 T-26s of the first model, were sold to Afghanistan during the same time period. [Kantakoski, p. 88]

In November 1937, Ji Yang, the official delegate of Chinese government negotiated with Stalin to try for military aid for the the War of China's Resistance Against Japan (1937-1945). The Soviet Union sold about 88 T-26 (1933 model) tanks and additional 20 BT-5 or BA-serie combat vehicles to China, as the part of totalling some $250 million of credits in munitions and supplies. These tanks and vehicles were shipped to Guangzhou habor in the Spring of 1938, and used to set up the 200th Infantry Division of the National Revolutionary Army of China. The 200th Infantry Division was actually a mechanized division consisting of four regiments, including the combat vehicle regiment equipped 70-80 T-26 tanks, the armored vehicle region equipped 50 BA-serial armored cars, the motorized infantry region equipped with trucks, and the artillery region with 122mm howitzers, 45mm anti-tank guns, 76 fieldguns. This equipment was manufactured in the Soviet Union. The T-26 tanks in Chinese army involved the Battle of Lanfeng in 1938, Battle of Kunlun Pass in the end of 1939, and the Battle of Yunnan-Burma Road in the Burma campaign in 1942. [cite book |last=The Department of Military History Research, Academy of Military Sciences of PLA | title=History of the War of China's Resistance Against Japan |year= 2005|publisher= Press of Liberation Army |location= Beijing, China | pages= 1237 |edition=2|id = ISBN 7-5065-4867-4] After World War II, the remaining T-26 tanks equipped the First Armored Region of the Army of Chinese Kuomingtang government, involved the Chinese Civil War (1946-1950) in East China battlefield. At last, the remain several T-26s were destroyed or captured by the People's Liberation Army during the Huaihai Campaign in 1949. [cite book |last= the editing team of this book | title=The Battle History of the Third Field Army of People's Liberation Army of China |year= 1996 |publisher= Press of Liberation Army |location= Beijing, China | pages= 559 |language=Chinese|id = ISBN 7-5065-3170-4]

Variants

* T-26 model 1931 (T-26A) — Twin-turret version with machine guns.
* T-26 model 1932 — Twin-turret version with 37 mm gun in one turret and machine gun in the other. Used as a platoon leader's vehicle.
* T-26TU — Command version with radios.
* T-26 model 1933 (T-26B) — Single turret version with 45 mm gun. Most numerous variant.
* T-26 model 1938 (T-26C) — New semi-conical turret with sloped armour. Welded construction.
* T-26 model 1939 (T-26S) — Semi-conical turret, increased armour with sloped hull sides and welded construction.
* T-26A artillery support tank — Mounting enlarged turret with 76.2 mm howitzer Model 27/32. The chassis was overloaded, and few were built.
* OT-26 — Flamethrower variant, using a single machine gun-type turret.
* OT-130 — Flamethrower variant of model 1933, using larger 45 mm gun turret without the gun.
* OT-133 — Flamethrower variant of model 1939, without a gun.
* OT-134 — Flamethrower variant of model 1939, with 45 mm gun.
* TT-26 — Teletank
* SU-5-1 — Self-propelled gun armed with 76.2 mm howitzer (few built).
* SU-5-2 — Self-propelled gun armed with 122 mm howitzer (few built).
* SU-5-3 — Self-propelled gun armed with 152.4 mm mortar (few built).
* T-26-T — Armoured artillery tractor based on the T-26 chassis. Early version had an unarmoured cab, the later T-26-T2 was fully armoured. Small numbers were produced in 1933 for motorized artillery batteries, to tow 76.2 mm divisional guns. Some remained in service until 1945.
* TN-26 ("Tank Nabludatel", "Observation Tank") — Experimental observation version of the T-26-T, with five-man crew and radio.
* T-26E — During the Interim Peace (1940–41), the Finns re-armed their remaining Vickers 6-Ton tanks with captured Soviet long 45 mm guns and the coaxial machine guns of the T-26s. The new tanks were renamed T-26E. They were used in combat in 1941–44 and remained in service until 1959.
*TR-4 - Armoured personnel carrier
*TR-26 - Armoured personnel carrier
*TR4-1 - Ammunition transportation vehicle
*TB-26 - Ammunition transportation vehicle
*T-26Ts - Fuel transportation vehicle
*TTs-26 - Fuel transportation vehicle
*ST-26 - Engineer tank

Operators

*AFG: 2 T-26 (first model)
*ROC: 88 T-26B (model 1933)
*FIN: 126 T-26
*flagicon|Germany|Nazi Germany: as the Panzerkampfwagen T-26 737(r)
*USSR
*flagicon|Spain|1939 Spain: 116 T-26B
*flagicon|Turkey|1931 Turkey: 60 T-26

Notes

References

Published sources

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* Candil, Antonio J. (1999). "Aid Mission to the Republicans Tested Doctrine and Equipment" in "Armor", March 1, 1999. Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor Center. ISSN 0004-2420.
* Daley, Dr. John (1999). "Soviet and German Advisors Put Doctrine to the Test" in "Armor", May 1, 1999. Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor Center. ISSN 0004-2420.
* Franco, Lucas M. (2006). "El Tanque de la Guerra Civil Española" in "Historia de la Iberia Vieja" es icon, No. 13. ISSN 1699-7913.
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* Hughes-Wilson, John (2006). "Snow and Slaughter at Suomussalmi" in "Military History", January 1, 2006. ISSN 0889-7328.
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* Woodel, Rosemary C. (April 2003). "Freezing in hell" in "Military History", Vol. 20 Issue 1. ISSN 0889-7328
* Zaloga, Steven J., James Grandsen (1981). "Soviet Heavy Tanks". London: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 0-85045-422-0.
* Zaloga, Steven J., James Grandsen (1984). "Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two". London: Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 0-85368-606-8.
* Zaloga, Steven J. " [http://libraryautomation.com/nymas/soviet_tank_operations_in_the_sp.htm Soviet Tank Operations in the Spanish Civil War] ", in "Journal of Slavic Military Studies", vol 12, no 3, September 1999.

Websites

* [http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=4022 Foreign tanks in Finnish service] , Axis History Factbook, [http://www.axishistory.com/ Axis History]
* [http://www.wwiivehicles.com/ussr/tanks_light/t26.html Russia's T-26 Light Tanks] Dead link|url=http://www.wwiivehicles.com/ussr/tanks_light/t26.html|date=October 2008, WWII Vehicles.com
* Ferris, Dave (2000–2003). " [http://www.irvania.com/downloads/TBOTRus1.pdf Russian/Soviet Section I (1915 to 1944) Russian/Soviet Section I (1915 to 1944)] ", in " [http://www.irvania.com/tbot.htm The Book of Tanks: A Wargamer's Portable Guide to Tanks, Self-Propelled Guns, Armoured Cars, and Personnel Carriers from World War I through the 1990s] ". Self-published, URL accessed 2006-11-10.