Corporate governance


Corporate governance
Not to be confused with corporate statism, a corporate approach to government rather than the government of a corporation

Corporate governance is a number of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions which have impact on the way a company is controlled.[1][2] An important theme of corporate governance is the nature and extent of accountability of people in the business, and mechanisms that try to decrease the principal-agent problem.[3]

Corporate governance also includes the relationships among the many stakeholders involved and the goals for which the corporation is governed.[4][5] In contemporary business corporations, the main external stakeholder groups are shareholders, debtholders, trade creditors, suppliers, customers and communities affected by the corporation's activities. Internal stakeholders are the board of directors, executives, and other employees.

A related but separate thread of discussions focuses on the impact of a corporate governance system on economic efficiency, with a strong emphasis on shareholders' welfare; this aspect is particularly present in contemporary public debates and developments in regulatory policy (see regulation and policy regulation).[6]

There has been renewed interest in the corporate governance practices of modern corporations since 2001, particularly due to the high-profile collapses of a number of large corporations, most of which involved accounting fraud. Corporate scandals of various forms have maintained public and political interest in the regulation of corporate governance. In the U.S., these include Enron Corporation and MCI Inc. (formerly WorldCom). Their demise is associated with the U.S. federal government passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, intending to restore public confidence in corporate governance. Comparable failures in Australia (HIH, One.Tel) are associated with the eventual passage of the CLERP 9 reforms. Similar corporate failures in other countries stimulated increased regulatory interest (e.g., Parmalat in Italy).

Contents

Principles of corporate governance

Contemporary discussions of corporate governance tend to refer to principles raised in three documents released since 1990: The Cadbury Report (UK, 1992), the Principals of Corporate Governance (OECD, 1998 and 2004), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (US, 2002). The Cadbury and OECD reports present general principals around which businesses are expected to operate to assure proper governance. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, informally referred to as Sarbox or Sox, is an attempt by the federal government in the United States to legislate several of the principles recommended in the Cadbury and OECD reports.

  • Rights and equitable treatment of shareholders:[7][8][9] Organizations should respect the rights of shareholders and help shareholders to exercise those rights. They can help shareholders exercise their rights by openly and effectively communicating information and by encouraging shareholders to participate in general meetings.
  • Interests of other stakeholders:[10] Organizations should recognize that they have legal, contractual, social, and market driven obligations to non-shareholder stakeholders, including employees, investors, creditors, suppliers, local communities, customers, and policy makers.
  • Role and responsibilities of the board:[11][12] The board needs sufficient relevant skills and understanding to review and challenge management performance. It also needs adequate size and appropriate levels of independence and commitment to fulfill its responsibilities and duties.
  • Integrity and ethical behavior:[13][14] Integrity should be a fundamental requirement in choosing corporate officers and board members. Organizations should develop a code of conduct for their directors and executives that promotes ethical and responsible decision making.
  • Disclosure and transparency:[15][16] Organizations should clarify and make publicly known the roles and responsibilities of board and management to provide stakeholders with a level of accountability. They should also implement procedures to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the company's financial reporting. Disclosure of material matters concerning the organization should be timely and balanced to ensure that all investors have access to clear, factual information.

Corporate governance models around the world

There are many different models of corporate governance around the world. These differ according to the variety of capitalism in which they are embedded. The Anglo-American "model" tends to emphasize the interests of shareholders. The coordinated or multi-stakeholder model associated with Continental Europe and Japan also recognizes the interests of workers, managers, suppliers, customers, and the community.

<This section needs brief factual descriptions of recognized "models," especially the Japanese model.>

Continental Europe

Some continental European countries, including Germany and Holland, require a two-tiered Board of Directors as a means of improving corporate governance.[17] In the two-tiered board, the Executive Board, made up of company executives, generally runs day-to-day operations while the supervisory board, made up entirely of non-executive directors who represent shareholders and employees, hires and fires the members of the executive board, determines their compensation, and reviews major business decisions.[18] See also Aktiengesellschaft.

India

India's SEBI Committee on Corporate Governance defines corporate governance as the "acceptance by management of the inalienable rights of shareholders as the true owners of the corporation and of their own role as trustees on behalf of the shareholders. It is about commitment to values, about ethical business conduct and about making a distinction between personal & corporate funds in the management of a company."[19] It has been suggested that the Indian approach is drawn from the Gandhian principle of trusteeship and the Directive Principles of the Indian Constitution, but this conceptualization of corporate objectives is also prevalent in Anglo-American and most other jurisdictions.

The United States and the United Kingdom

The so-called "Anglo-American model" (also known as "the unitary system"[20]) emphasizes a single-tiered Board of Directors composed of a mixture of executives from the company and non-executive directors, all of whom are elected by shareholders.[21] Non-executive directors are expected to outnumber executive directors and hold key posts, including audit and compensation committees. The United States and the United Kingdom differ in one critical respect with regard to corporate governance: In the United Kingdom, the CEO generally does not also serve as Chairman of the Board, whereas in the US having the dual role is the norm, despite major misgivings regarding the impact on corporate governance.[22]

In the United States, corporations are directly governed by state laws, while the exchange (offering and trading) of securities in corporations (including shares) is governed by federal legislation. Many U.S. states have adopted the Model Business Corporation Act, but the dominant state law for publicly-traded corporations is Delaware, which continues to be the place of incorporation for the majority of publicly-traded corporations.[23] Individual rules for corporations are based upon the corporate charter and, less authoritatively, the corporate bylaws.[23] Shareholders cannot initiate changes in the corporate charter although they can initiate changes to the corporate bylaws.[23]

Regulation

Legal environment - General

Corporations are created as legal persons by the laws and regulations of a particular jurisdiction. These may vary in many respects between countries, but a corporation's legal person status is fundamental to all jurisdictions and is conferred by statute. This allows the entity to hold property in its own right without reference to any particular real person. It also results in the perpetual existence that characterizes the modern corporation. The statutory granting of corporate existence may arise from general purpose legislation (which is the general case) or from a statute to create a specific corporation, which was the only method prior to the 19th century.

In addition to the statutory laws of the relevant jurisdiction, corporations are subject to common law in some countries, and various laws and regulations affecting business practices. In most jurisdiction, corporations also have a constitution that provides individual rules that govern the corporation and authorize or constrain its decision-makers. This constitution is identified by a variety of terms; in English-speaking jurisdictions, it is usually known as the Corporate Charter or the [Memorandum and] Articles of Association. The capacity of shareholders to modify the constitution of their corporation can vary substantially.

Codes and guidelines

Corporate governance principles and codes have been developed in different countries and issued from stock exchanges, corporations, institutional investors, or associations (institutes) of directors and managers with the support of governments and international organizations. As a rule, compliance with these governance recommendations is not mandated by law, although the codes linked to stock exchange listing requirements may have a coercive effect. For example, companies quoted on the London, Toronto and Australian Stock Exchanges formally need not follow the recommendations of their respective codes. However, they must disclose whether they follow the recommendations in those documents and, where not, they should provide explanations concerning divergent practices. Such disclosure requirements exert a significant pressure on listed companies for compliance.

One of the most influential guidelines has been the 1999 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. This was revised in 2004. The OECD guidelines are often referenced by countries developing local codes or guidelines. Building on the work of the OECD, other international organizations, private sector associations and more than 20 national corporate governance codes, the United Nations Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR) has produced their Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure. This internationally agreed[24] benchmark consists of more than fifty distinct disclosure items across five broad categories:[25]

  • Auditing
  • Board and management structure and process
  • Corporate responsibility and compliance
  • Financial transparency and information disclosure
  • Ownership structure and exercise of control rights

The investor-led organisation International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) was set up by individuals centered around the ten largest pension funds in the world 1995. The aim is to promote global corporate governance standards. The network is led by investors that manage 18 trillion dollars and members are located in fifty different countries. ICGN has developed a suite of global guidelines ranging from shareholder rights to business ethics. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) has done work on corporate governance, particularly on accountability and reporting, and in 2004 released Issue Management Tool: Strategic challenges for business in the use of corporate responsibility codes, standards, and frameworks. This document offers general information and a perspective from a business association/think-tank on a few key codes, standards and frameworks relevant to the sustainability agenda.

In 2009, the International Finance Corporation and the UN Global Compact released a report, Corporate Governance - the Foundation for Corporate Citizenship and Sustainable Business, linking the environmental, social and governance responsibilities of a company to its financial performance and long-term sustainability.

Most codes are largely voluntary. An issue raised in the U.S. since the 2005 Disney decision[26] is the degree to which companies manage their governance responsibilities; in other words, do they merely try to supersede the legal threshold, or should they create governance guidelines that ascend to the level of best practice. For example, the guidelines issued by associations of directors, corporate managers and individual companies tend to be wholly voluntary but such documents may have a wider effect by prompting other companies to adopt similar practices.

History - United States

In 19th century United States, state corporation laws enhanced the rights of corporate boards to govern without unanimous consent of shareholders in exchange for statutory benefits like appraisal rights, to make corporate governance more efficient. Since that time, and because most large publicly traded corporations in the US are incorporated under corporate administration friendly Delaware law, and because the US's wealth has been increasingly securitized into various corporate entities and institutions, the rights of individual owners and shareholders have become increasingly derivative and dissipated.

In the 20th century in the immediate aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929 legal scholars such as Adolf Augustus Berle, Edwin Dodd, and Gardiner C. Means pondered on the changing role of the modern corporation in society. Berle and Means' monograph "The Modern Corporation and Private Property" (1932, Macmillan) continues to have a profound influence on the conception of corporate governance in scholarly debates today. From the Chicago school of economics, Ronald Coase's "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) introduced the notion of transaction costs into the understanding of why firms are founded and how they continue to behave. Fifty years later, Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen's "The Separation of Ownership and Control" (1983, Journal of Law and Economics) firmly established agency theory as a way of understanding corporate governance: the firm is seen as a series of contracts. Agency theory's dominance was highlighted in a 1989 article by Kathleen Eisenhardt ("Agency theory: an assessment and review", Academy of Management Review).

US expansion after World War II through the emergence of multinational corporations saw the establishment of the managerial class. Accordingly, the following Harvard Business School management professors published influential monographs studying their prominence: Myles Mace (entrepreneurship), Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (business history), Jay Lorsch (organizational behavior) and Elizabeth MacIver (organizational behavior). According to Lorsch and MacIver "many large corporations have dominant control over business affairs without sufficient accountability or monitoring by their board of directors."

Over the past three decades, corporate directors’ duties in the U.S. have expanded beyond their traditional legal responsibility of duty of loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.[27]

In the first half of the 1990s, the issue of corporate governance in the U.S. received considerable press attention due to the wave of CEO dismissals (e.g.: IBM, Kodak, Honeywell) by their boards. The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) led a wave of institutional shareholder activism (something only very rarely seen before), as a way of ensuring that corporate value would not be destroyed by the now traditionally cozy relationships between the CEO and the board of directors (e.g., by the unrestrained issuance of stock options, not infrequently back dated).

In 1997, the East Asian Financial Crisis severely affected the economies of Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and The Philippines through the exit of foreign capital after property assets collapsed. The lack of corporate governance mechanisms in these countries highlighted the weaknesses of the institutions in their economies.

In the early 2000s, the massive bankruptcies (and criminal malfeasance) of Enron and Worldcom, as well as lesser corporate scandals, such as Adelphia Communications, AOL, Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing, Tyco, led to increased political interest in corporate governance. This is reflected in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

Parties to corporate governance

The most influential parties involved in corporate governance include government agencies and authorities, stock exchanges, management (including the board of directors and its chair, the Chief Executive Officer or the equivalent, other executives and line management, shareholders and auditors). Other influential stakeholders may include lenders, suppliers, employees, creditors, customers and the community at large.

The agency view of the corporation posits that the shareholder forgoes decision rights (control) and entrusts the manager to act in the shareholders' best (joint) interests. Partly as a result of this separation between the two investors and managers, corporate governance mechanisms include a system of controls intended to help align managers' incentives with those of shareholders. Agency concerns (risk) are necessarily lower for a controlling shareholder.

A board of directors is expected to play a key role in corporate governance. The board has the responsibility of endorsing the organization's strategy, developing directional policy, appointing, supervising and remunerating senior executives, and ensuring accountability of the organization to its investors and authorities.

All parties to corporate governance have an interest, whether direct or indirect, in the financial performance of the corporation. Directors, workers and management receive salaries, benefits and reputation, while investors expect to receive financial returns. For lenders, it is specified interest payments, while returns to equity investors arise from dividend distributions or capital gains on their stock. Customers are concerned with the certainty of the provision of goods and services of an appropriate quality; suppliers are concerned with compensation for their goods or services, and possible continued trading relationships. These parties provide value to the corporation in the form of financial, physical, human and other forms of capital. Many parties may also be concerned with corporate social performance.

A key factor in a party's decision to participate in or engage with a corporation is their confidence that the corporation will deliver the party's expected outcomes. When categories of parties (stakeholders) do not have sufficient confidence that a corporation is being controlled and directed in a manner consistent with their desired outcomes, they are less likely to engage with the corporation. When this becomes an endemic system feature, the loss of confidence and participation in markets may affect many other stakeholders, and increases the likelihood of political action. There is substantial interest in how external systems and institutions, including markets, influence corporate governance.

Ownership structures and elements

Ownership structure refers to the types and composition of shareholders in a corporation. Researchers often "measure" ownership structures by using some observable measures of ownership concentration or the extent of inside ownership. Some features or types of ownership structure involving corporate groups include pyramids, cross-shareholdings, rings, and webs. German "concerns" (Konzern) are legally recognized corporate groups with complex structures. Japanese keiretsu (系列) and South Korean chaebol (which tend to be family-controlled) are corporate groups which consist of complex interlocking business relationships and shareholdings. Cross-shareholding are an essential feature of keiretsu and chaebol groups) [4]. Corporate engagement with shareholders and other stakeholders can differ substantially across different ownership structures.

Family ownership

In many jurisdictions, family interests dominate ownership structures. It is sometimes suggested that corporations controlled by family interests are subject to superior oversight compared to corporations "controlled" by institutional investors (or with such diverse share ownership that they are controlled by management). A recent study by Credit Suisse found that companies in which "founding families retain a stake of more than 10% of the company's capital enjoyed a superior performance over their respective sectorial peers." Since 1996, this superior performance amounts to 8% per year.[28] Forget the celebrity CEO. "Look beyond Six Sigma and the latest technology fad. A study by Business Week[29] claims that "BW identified five key ingredients that contribute to superior performance. Not all are qualities are unique to enterprises with retained family interests."

Institutional investors

Many years ago, worldwide, investors were typically individuals or families, irrespective of whether or not they acted through a controlled entity. Over time, markets have become largely institutionalized: investors are largely institutions that invest the pooled funds of their intended beneficiaries. These institutional investors include pension funds (also known as superannuation funds), mutual funds, hedge funds, exchange-traded funds, and financial institutions such as insurance companies and banks. In this way, the majority of investment now is described as "institutional investment" even though the vast majority of the funds are for the benefit of individual investors.

The significance of institutional investors varies substantially across countries. In developed Anglo-American countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, U.K., U.S.), institutional investors dominate the market for stocks in larger corporations. While the majority of the shares in the Japanese market are held by financial companies and industrial corporations, these are not institutional investors if their holdings are largely with-on group.

The largest pools of invested money (such as the mutual fund 'Vanguard 500', or the largest investment management firm for corporations, State Street Corp.) are designed to maximize the benefits of diversified investment by investing in a very large number of different corporations with sufficient liquidity. The idea is this strategy will largely eliminate individual firm financial or other risk and. A consequence of this approach is that these investors have relatively little interest in the governance of a particular corporation. It is often assumed that, if institutional investors pressing for will likely be costly because of "golden handshakes") or the effort required, they will simply sell out their interest.

Mechanisms and controls

Corporate governance mechanisms and controls are designed to reduce the inefficiencies that arise from moral hazard and adverse selection. For example, to monitor managers' behavior, an independent third party (the external auditor) attests the accuracy of information provided by management to investors. An ideal control system should regulate both motivation and ability.

Internal corporate governance controls

Internal corporate governance controls monitor activities and then take corrective action to accomplish organisational goals. Examples include:

  • Monitoring by the board of directors: The board of directors, with its legal authority to hire, fire and compensate top management, safeguards invested capital. Regular board meetings allow potential problems to be identified, discussed and avoided. Whilst non-executive directors are thought to be more independent, they may not always result in more effective corporate governance and may not increase performance.[30] Different board structures are optimal for different firms. Moreover, the ability of the board to monitor the firm's executives is a function of its access to information. Executive directors possess superior knowledge of the decision-making process and therefore evaluate top management on the basis of the quality of its decisions that lead to financial performance outcomes, ex ante. It could be argued, therefore, that executive directors look beyond the financial criteria.
  • Internal control procedures and internal auditors: Internal control procedures are policies implemented by an entity's board of directors, audit committee, management, and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance of the entity achieving its objectives related to reliable financial reporting, operating efficiency, and compliance with laws and regulations. Internal auditors are personnel within an organization who test the design and implementation of the entity's internal control procedures and the reliability of its financial reporting
  • Balance of power: The simplest balance of power is very common; require that the President be a different person from the Treasurer. This application of separation of power is further developed in companies where separate divisions check and balance each other's actions. One group may propose company-wide administrative changes, another group review and can veto the changes, and a third group check that the interests of people (customers, shareholders, employees) outside the three groups are being met.
  • Remuneration: Performance-based remuneration is designed to relate some proportion of salary to individual performance. It may be in the form of cash or non-cash payments such as shares and share options, superannuation or other benefits. Such incentive schemes, however, are reactive in the sense that they provide no mechanism for preventing mistakes or opportunistic behavior, and can elicit myopic behavior.

In publicly-traded U.S. corporations, boards of directors are largely chosen by the President/CEO and the President/CEO often takes the Chair of the Board position for his/herself (which makes it much more difficult for the institutional owners to "fire" him/her). The practice of the CEO also being the Chair of the Board is known as "duality". While this practice is common in the U.S., it is relatively rare elsewhere. It is illegal in the U.K.

External corporate governance controls

External corporate governance controls encompass the controls external stakeholders exercise over the organization. Examples include:

  • competition
  • debt covenants
  • demand for and assessment of performance information (especially financial statements)
  • government regulations
  • managerial labour market
  • media pressure
  • takeovers

Financial reporting and the independent auditor

The board of directors has primary responsibility for the corporation's external financial reporting functions. The Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer are crucial participants and boards usually have a high degree of reliance on them for the integrity and supply of accounting information. They oversee the internal accounting systems, and are dependent on the corporation'saccountants and internal auditors.

Current accounting rules under International Accounting Standards and U.S. GAAP allow managers some choice in determining the methods of measurement and criteria for recognition of various financial reporting elements. The potential exercise of this choice to improve apparent performance (see creative accounting and earnings management) increases the information risk for users. Financial reporting fraud, including non-disclosure and deliberate falsification of values also contributes to users' information risk. To reduce these risk and to enhance the perceived integrity of financial reports, corporation financial reports must be audited by an independent external auditor who issues a report that accompanies the financial statements (see financial audit). It is

One area of concern is whether the auditing firm acts as both the independent auditor and management consultant to the firm they are auditing. This may result in a conflict of interest which places the integrity of financial reports in doubt due to client pressure to appease management. The power of the corporate client to initiate and terminate management consulting services and, more fundamentally, to select and dismiss accounting firms contradicts the concept of an independent auditor. Changes enacted in the United States in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (following numerous corporate scandals, culminating with the Enron scandal) prohibit accounting firms from providing both auditing and management consulting services. Similar provisions are in place under clause 49 of Standard Listing Agreement in India.

Systemic problems of corporate governance

  • Demand for information: In order to influence the directors, the shareholders must combine with others to form a voting group which can pose a real threat of carrying resolutions or appointing directors at a general meeting.
  • Monitoring costs: A barrier to shareholders using good information is the cost of processing it, especially to a small shareholder. The traditional answer to this problem is the efficient market hypothesis (in finance, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are efficient), which suggests that the small shareholder will free ride on the judgments of larger professional investors.
  • Supply of accounting information: Financial accounts form a crucial link in enabling providers of finance to monitor directors. Imperfections in the financial reporting process will cause imperfections in the effectiveness of corporate governance. This should, ideally, be corrected by the working of the external auditing process.

Executive remuneration/compensation

Research on the relationship between firm performance and executive compensation does not identify consistent and significant relationships between executives' remuneration and firm performance. Not all firms experience the same levels of agency conflict, and external and internal monitoring devices may be more effective for some than for others.

Some researchers have found that the largest CEO performance incentives came from ownership of the firm's shares, while other researchers found that the relationship between share ownership and firm performance was dependent on the level of ownership. The results suggest that increases in ownership above 20% cause management to become more entrenched, and less interested in the welfare of their shareholders.

Some argue that firm performance is positively associated with share option plans and that these plans direct managers' energies and extend their decision horizons toward the long-term, rather than the short-term, performance of the company. However, that point of view came under substantial criticism circa in the wake of various security scandals including mutual fund timing episodes and, in particular, the backdating of option grants as documented by University of Iowa academic Erik Lie and reported by James Blander and Charles Forelle of the Wall Street Journal.

Even before the negative influence on public opinion caused by the 2006 backdating scandal, use of options faced various criticisms. A particularly forceful and long running argument concerned the interaction of executive options with corporate stock repurchase programs. Numerous authorities (including U.S. Federal Reserve Board economist Weisbenner) determined options may be employed in concert with stock buybacks in a manner contrary to shareholder interests. These authors argued that, in part, corporate stock buybacks for U.S. Standard & Poors 500 companies surged to a $500 billion annual rate in late 2006 because of the impact of options. A compendium of academic works on the option/buyback issue is included in the study Scandal by author M. Gumport issued in 2006.

A combination of accounting changes and governance issues led options to become a less popular means of remuneration as 2006 progressed, and various alternative implementations of buybacks surfaced to challenge the dominance of "open market" cash buybacks as the preferred means of implementing a share repurchase plan.

See also

References

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  2. ^ Cadbury, Adrian, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Gee, London, December, 1992, p. 15
  3. ^ Bowen, William G., Inside the Boardroom: Governance by Directors and Trustees, John Wiley & Sons, 1994, ISBN 0-471-02501-1
  4. ^ "OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004". OECD. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf. Retrieved 2011-07-20. 
  5. ^ Tricker, Adrian, Essentials for Board Directors: An A-Z Guide, Bloomberg Press, New York, 2009, ISBN 978-1-57660-354-3
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  7. ^ "OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004, Articles II and III". OECD. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf. Retrieved 2011-07-24. 
  8. ^ Cadbury, Adrian, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Gee, London, December, 1992, Sections 3.4
  9. ^ Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, US Congress, Title VIII
  10. ^ "OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004, Preamble and Article IV". OECD. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf. Retrieved 2011-07-24. 
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  12. ^ Cadbury, Adrian, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Gee, London, December, 1992, Section 3.4
  13. ^ Cadbury, Adrian, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Gee, London, December, 1992, Sections 3.2, 3.3, 4.33, 4.51 and 7.4
  14. ^ Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, US Congress, Title I, 101(c)(1), Title VIII, and Title IX, 406
  15. ^ "OECD Principals of Corporate Governance, 2004, Articles I and V". OECD. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf. Retrieved 2011-07-24. 
  16. ^ Cadbury, Adrian, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Gee, London, December, 1992, Section 3.2
  17. ^ Tricker, Bob, Essentials for Board Directors: An A-Z Guide, Second Edition, Bloomberg Press, New York, 2009, ISBN 978-1-57660-354-3
  18. ^ Hopt, Klaus J., "The German Two-Tier Board (Aufsichtsrat), A German View on Corporate Governance" in Hopt, Klaus J. and Wymeersch, Eddy (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance: Essays and Materials, de Gruyter, Berlin & New York, 1997, ISBN 3-11-015765-9
  19. ^ "Report of tbe SEBI Committee on Corporate Governance, February 2003". SEBI Committee on Corporate Governance. http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.pdf. Retrieved 2011-07-20. 
  20. ^ Cadbury, Adrian, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Gee, London, December, 1992
  21. ^ Mallin, Christine A., "Corporate Governance Developments in the UK" in Mallin, Christine A (ed), Handbook on International Corporate Governance: Country Analyses, Second Edition, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, ISBN 978-1-84980-123-2
  22. ^ Bowen, William G, The Board Book: An Insider's Guide for Directors and Trustees, W.W. Norton & Company, New York & London, 2008, ISBN 978-0-393-06645-6
  23. ^ a b c Bebchuck LA. (2004).The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power.Harvard Law Review.
  24. ^ TD/B/COM.2/ISAR/31
  25. ^ "International Standards of Accounting and Reporting, Corporate Governance Disclosure". United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2920&lang=1. Retrieved 2008-11-09. 
  26. ^ The Disney Decision of 2005 and the precedent it sets for corporate governance and fiduciary responsibility, Kuckreja, Akin Gump, Aug 2005
  27. ^ Crawford, Curtis J. (2007). The Reform of Corporate Governance: Major Trends in the U.S. Corporate Boardroom, 1977-1997. doctoral dissertation, Capella University. [1]
  28. ^ [2]
  29. ^ [3]
  30. ^ Bhagat & Black, "The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance", 54 Business Lawyer)

Further reading

  • Arcot, Sridhar, Bruno, Valentina and Antoine Faure-Grimaud, "Corporate Governance in the U.K.: is the comply-or-explain working?" (December 2005). FMG CG Working Paper 001.
  • Becht, Marco, Patrick Bolton, Ailsa Röell, "Corporate Governance and Control" (October 2002; updated August 2004). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002.
  • Bowen, William, 1998 and 2004, The Board Book: An Insider's Guide for Directors and Trustees, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, ISBN 978-0-393-06645-6
  • Brickley, James A., William S. Klug and Jerold L. Zimmerman, Managerial Economics & Organizational Architecture, ISBN
  • Cadbury, Sir Adrian, "The Code of Best Practice", Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Gee and Co Ltd, 1992. Available online from [5]
  • Cadbury, Sir Adrian, "Corporate Governance: Brussels", Instituut voor Bestuurders, Brussels, 1996.
  • Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H.P. (2000) The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 58: 81-112
  • Clarke, Thomas (ed.) (2004) "Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance," London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 0-415-32308-8
  • Clarke, Thomas (ed.) (2004) "Critical Perspectives on Business and Management: 5 Volume Series on Corporate Governance - Genesis, Anglo-American, European, Asian and Contemporary Corporate Governance" London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 0-415-32910-8
  • Clarke, Thomas (2007) "International Corporate Governance " London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 0-415-32309-6
  • Clarke, Thomas & Chanlat, Jean-Francois (eds.) (2009) "European Corporate Governance " London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 9780415405331
  • Clarke, Thomas & dela Rama, Marie (eds.) (2006) "Corporate Governance and Globalization (3 Volume Series)" London and Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, ISBN 978-1-4129-2899-1
  • Clarke, Thomas & dela Rama, Marie (eds.) (2008) "Fundamentals of Corporate Governance (4 Volume Series)" London and Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, ISBN 978-1-4129-3589-0
  • Colley, J., Doyle, J., Logan, G., Stettinius, W., What is Corporate Governance ? (McGraw-Hill, December 2004) ISBN
  • Crawford, C. J. (2007). Compliance & conviction: the evolution of enlightened corporate governance. Santa Clara, Calif: XCEO. ISBN 0-976-90191-9 ISBN 978-0-97-690191-4
  • Denis, D.K. and J.J. McConnell (2003), International Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38 (1): 1-36.
  • Dignam, A and Lowry, J (2006) Company Law, Oxford University Press ISBN 978-0-19-928936-3
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, ISBN
  • Easterbrook, Frank H. and Daniel R. Fischel, International Journal of Governance, ISBN
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