Dutchbat

DUTCHBAT (military short term for "Dutch battalion") nominally was a Dutch battalion under command of the United Nations in operation United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). It was hastily formed out of the emerging first ever Air Mobile Brigade of the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces between February, 1994 and November, 1995 to participate in the peacekeeping operation in former Yugoslavia. To it fell the role of safekeeping the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica during the Yugoslav wars (1992–1995). In its third replacement, "Dutchbat III," commanded by lieutenant colonel Thomas Karremans, the enclave fell to the Bosnian Serbs under colonel general Ratko Mladic, His troops included the Scorpions group. Thousands of men and children were transported to places nearby; CIA U-2 spy planes followed the operation and took pictures of mass graves being dug: the end of the road for these people. The pictures were only made public much later. Many other Bosniaks tried to flee alone and in large groups and were killed in the woods.

Operation

DUTCHBAT, in spite of the grandiose name, never was anything approaching a battalion. The four mission consisted of about 450 troops each rotation called Dutchbat I, II, III and IV. Armament was personal weapons and machine guns, in accordance with the UN mandate of UNPROFOR. The headquarters were installed in an old battery factory in Potočari, 5 km from Srebrenica, and used 30 observation posts (OPs) throughout the perimeter of the enclave, mostly consisting of a sandbagged armored car and associated personnel and equipment.

UNPROFOR's mission was the protection of the civilian populace, of this Bosnian enclave (dubbed a "secure area" or "safe haven" by the UN) amongst many other places in former Yugoslavia. and its Rules of Engagement (ROE) allowed only to use force in acts of self-defense, counting on air support from NATO to guarantee the mission. Intervening in the fighting was strictly forbidden to all NATO troops, often to their great frustration. DUTCHBAT's zone fell under siege by the VRS, the Army of the Republika Srpska when NATO air forces started an all-out attack on the Bosnian Serbs besieging Sarajevo

Events

Former Dutchbat area in Srebrenica/Potočari

Described by some analysts as "a mousehole" because of its geographic location in a valley enclosed by hills and mountains, as befits a winter resort, the enclave underwent an easy blockade by the Bosnian-Serbian forces of Colonel General Ratko Mladić, isolating the Dutch battalion, causing serious deficiencies in provisions. One Dutch soldier died March 9 by mortar fire by VRS. When VRS artillery squashed the resistance of the 28ª Mountain Infantry Division, ARBiH, defending the town, Lieutenant-Colonel (Lt. Col., "Overste") Karremans made an urgent request for air support from the United Nations for two Dutch F-16s to attack heavy armour of the VRS. The attack never took place. It had to be cancelled when Serbian forces threatened the execution of 50 members of Dutchbat III seized as hostages. Mladić's column then took the town July 11, 1995, causing the displacement of many of the city's inhabitants. About 15,000 displaced persons undertook the flight towards Tuzla on foot, but the majority looked for protection from the UN blue helmets in Potocari. During the flight of the column towards Tuzla, Dutch soldier Raviv van Rensen was attacked by the Bosnian Serbs and died.

Mladić met with Lt. Col. Karremans (video of the meeting is available on Youtube), and by serious threats made sure DUTCHBAT did not take part in the outcome. Under pretext of evacuating the Bosniak population to a sheltered city, most of the women and children were transferred by bus to a zone under Bosnian-Serb control, assuring that the men would be transferred later. But the Bosnian Serbs perpetrated a genocide on the males, the now well-known massacre of Srebrenica, in which approximately 8,000 Bosniak men of different ages were murdered by the military and paramilitary Bosnian-Serbian forces. On the 21st of July, with the entire zone already under control of the VRS, the Dutch battalion left the enclave. Its leave and Mladić's effusive goodbyes and gifts, filmed by Mladić's own propaganda teams, were picked up by TV stations worldwide.

From July till November 2005 Dutchbat IV served and mainly dealt with refugees at Simin Han, near Tuzla.

Consequences

This incident had great impact on public opinion in the Netherlands. An official investigation of the incident on the part of the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (Nederlands Instituut voor oorlogsdocumentatie, NIOD] lasting seven years, published April 10, 2002, made the Prime Minister Wim Kok resign within six days. The 3,400-page report criticized the political and military High Commands of the Netherlands as being guilty of criminal negligence, for not preventing the massacre. The conclusions were devastating:

• The mission was not suitably prepared.
• There was no coordination between the Ministry of Defence (under Joris Voorhoeve) and of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (under Hans van Mierlo).
• The contingent did not receive sufficient means to accomplish the mission. Adequate firepower and Forward Air Controllers (FACS) to direct air attacks were missing.
• The non-Dutch in charge of air support refused to give aid as requested by Karremans.
• The Netherlands and the UN did not perform their duty.

On December 4, 2006, Minister of Defence Henk Kamp gave a decoration to the soldiers of Dutchbat III, draaginsigne DBIII. This award was severely criticized by the public as well as by some survivors and relatives of Srebrenica victims. In June 2007 an association of relatives of the victims of the massacre presented a denunciation in The Hague against the Government of the Netherlands and the UN for its negligence in the massacre. In October of the same year, twelve former members of DUTCHBAT III visited the Memorial for the Srebrenica massacre, paying tribute to the victims. The same group of relatives opposed their act of atonement to open dialogue. According to testimonies of 171 of the members of the battalion, 65% left the Army, 40% of these requested psychological treatment, and 10% show symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (official figure; health professionals treating these people deem the number much higher).

External links

• Toespraak minister van Defensie bij de bijeenkomst Dutchbat III
• NU report