Takeo Kurita

Infobox Military Person
name= Takeo Kurita
born= 28 April 1889
died= 19 December 1977 [Nishida, "Imperial Japanese Navy".]
placeofbirth=Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan
placeofdeath=


caption=Japanese Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita
nickname=
allegiance=Empire of Japan
branch=navy|Empire of Japan
serviceyears=1910-1945
rank=Vice Admiral (Kaigun Chujo)
commands="Shigure", "Oite" "Wakatake", "Hagi", "Hamakaze", "Urakaze" 25th Destroyer Group and 10th Destroyer Group, 12th Destroyer Group "Abukuma", "Kongō" Cruiser Division 7, Battleship Division 3, IJN 2nd Fleet
unit=
battles=World War II Indian Ocean Raid Battle of Midway Guadalcanal campaign Battle of the Sibuyan Sea Battle off Samar Battle of the Philippine Sea Battle of Leyte Gulf
awards=
family=
laterwork=
Vice Admiral nihongo|Takeo Kurita|栗田 健男|Kurita Takeo|extra= 28 April 1889 - 19 December 1977 was a vice-admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II.

Biography

Early life

Kurita was born in Mito city, Ibaraki prefecture in 1889. His name, Takeo means warrior. He was sent off to Eta Jima in 1905 and graduated from the 38th class of the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy in 1910, ranked 28th out of a class of 149 cadets. As a midshipman he served on the cruisers "Kasagi" and "Niitaka". On being commissioned as ensign in 1911, he was assigned to "Tatsuta".

After his promotion to sub-lieutenant in 1913, Kurita served on the battleship "Satsuma", destroyer "Sakaki" and cruiser "Iwate". Kurita became a lieutenant on 1 December 1916, and served on a number of ships: cruiser "Tone", destroyers "Kaba" and "Minekaze". He also served as either the chief torpedo officer or executive officer on "Minekaze", "Yakaze", and "Hakaze". In 1920, he was given his first command: the destroyer "Shigure". In 1921, he assumed command of "Oite".

Promoted to lieutenant commander in 1922, Kurita captained the destroyers "Wakatake", "Hagi", and "Hamakaze". As commander from 1927, he commanded the destroyer "Urakaze", 25th Destroyer Group and 10th Destroyer Group.

As captain from 1932, he commanded the 12th Destroyer Group, the cruiser "Abukuma", and, from 1937, the battleship "Kongō".

Kurita became a rear-admiral on 15 November 1938, and was in command of Cruiser Division 7 at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

World War II

Early campaigns

Kurita's Cruiser Division 7 participated in the invasion of Java in the Dutch East Indies in December 1941, and in the Indian Ocean Raid. During the Battle of Midway (serving under Nobutake Kondō) he lost the cruiser "Mikuma". Kurita was promoted to vice admiral on 1 May 1942, and was reassigned to Battleship Division 3 in July.

In the Guadalcanal Campaign Kurita led his battleships in an intense bombardment of Henderson Field on the night of 13 October, firing 918 shells at the American air base. It was the single most successful such attempt to incapacitate Henderson by naval bombardment. Kurita later commanded major naval forces during the Central Solomon Islands campaign and the Battle of Philippine Sea. In 1943 he replaced Kondō as commander of IJN 2nd Fleet.

Battle of Leyte Gulf

It was as Commander-in-Chief of the IJN 2nd Fleet during the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea and the Battle off Samar (Both part of the Battle of Leyte Gulf) for which Kurita is best known. The IJN 2nd Fleet included the largest battleships in the world, "Yamato" and "Musashi". Additionally, the IJN 2nd Fleet included the battleships "Nagato", "Kongō", and "Haruna", ten cruisers and thirteen destroyers. Critically, however, the IJN Second Fleet did not include any aircraft carriers. Kurita was a dedicated officer and hoped for a glorious death in battle, but like Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, not one in vain. Like Yamamoto, Kurita believed that for a captain to “go down with his ship” was a wasteful loss of valuable naval experience and leadership. When ordered by Admiral Soemu Toyoda to take his fleet through the San Bernardino Strait in the central Philippines and attack the American landings at Leyte, Kurita thought the effort a waste of ships and lives, especially since he could not get his fleet to Leyte Gulf until after the landings, leaving little more than empty transports for his huge battleships to attack. He bitterly resented his superiors, who, while safe in bunkers in Tokyo, ordered Kurita to fight to the death against hopeless odds and without air cover.

Battle of the Sibuyan Sea

While his fleet was enroute from Brunei, Kurita's ships were attacked by two American submarines, which sunk two cruisers (Atago and Maya) in the Palawan Passage. Kurita in the flagship Atago was forced to transfer to Yamato. While in the confines of the Sibuyan Sea and approaching the San Bernardino Strait, he was again attacked by US carrier planes which damaged several other ships, including "Yamato". Constant air attacks from Admiral William "Bull" Halsey's US Third Fleet scored a number of torpedo and dive bomber hits on the "Yamato", mortally wounding "Musashi", and scoring a number of hits on other vessels. These attacks caused Kurita to call off his attack and turn his fleet west away from Leyte Gulf. This began a chain of events that continues to engage historians and biographers to this day. Halsey, believing that he had mauled Kurita's fleet and that the Japanese "Central Forces" were retreating, and believing that he had the orders and authorization to do so, abandoned his station guarding General MacArthur's landing at Leyte Gulf and the San Bernardino Strait, in order to pursue Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa's Northern Fleet of Japanese carriers that were sent as a decoy to lure the Americans away from Leyte. But before doing so, in fact before Ozawa's force had been sighted, Halsey had sent a message announcing a "battle plan" to detach his battleships to cover the exit of the strait. With the decision to attack Ozawa, this battle plan was never executed and the heavy ships went north with the carriers.

Battle off Samar

Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, Commander Seventh Fleet and responsible for protecting the landing forces, assumed that Halsey's "Battle Plan" was a deployment order and that Task Force 34 was actually guarding San Bernadino. Kinkaid thus concentrated his battleships to the south in order to face the Japanese "Southern Force." During the night of October 24-25, Kurita changed his mind again, and turned his ships east toward Leyte Gulf. On the morning of 25 October 1944, Kurita's fleet, lead by "Yamato" exited San Bernardino Strait and sailed south along the coast of Samar. A half hour after dawn, the battleships of the Imperial Japanese Naval sighted "Taffy 3" – a task unit of Kinkaid's covering forces that consisted of six escort carriers, three destroyers and four small destroyer escorts, commanded by Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague. Taffy 3 was designed to provide shore support and anti-submarine patrols; not to engage in fleet action against battleships.

Admiral Kurita thought he had chanced upon the carriers of the American Third Fleet and ordered his battleships to open fire, including Yamato with her 18-inch guns. However, the moment Taffy 3 was sighted, the "Central Force" had just been ordered to change from night-time to air defense steaming formation, but had not yet completed the maneuver. Rather than properly form his ships for action with the enemy, Kurita at this point gave the order for "General Attack". His ships thus charged uncoordinated into action and Kurita quickly lost tactical control of the battle.

Kurita's forces mauled the American ships, sinking one of the small carriers, two destroyers, including the "USS Johnston", commanded by Captain Ernest E. Evans. But the planes from Taffy 3 and Taffy 2, stationed farther south, fought back, and although the American destroyers had only 5-inch guns, they too attacked, launched torpedoes and laid smoke. These determined attacks by the escorts and continual air attacks served to further confuse and separate Kurita's forces. Kurita, whose flagship Yamato fell far behind early in the battle while avoiding an aerial torpedo attack, lost sight of the enemy and many of his own ships. Meanwhile, the courageous efforts of the Taffies had sunk two heavy cruisers and knocked a third out of action. Many of his other ships had also been hit. After about two and a half hours action with Taffy 3, Kurita ordered his force to re-group on a northerly course, away from Leyte.

By this time, Kurita had news that the Japanese "Southern Force", which was to attack Leyte Gulf from the south, had already been destroyed by Kinkaid's aging battleships, which were too far south to attack Kurita's forces. Admiral Kurita's "Central Force" had fewer than half its ships. With "Musashi" gone, Kurita had 4 battleships but only 3 cruisers remaining, and all of his ships were damaged and low on fuel. Kurita was intercepting messages that indicated Admiral Halsey had sunk the four carriers of the "Northern Force" and was racing back to Leyte with his battleships to confront the Japanese fleet and that powerful elements of Seventh Fleet were approaching from out Leyte Gulf. After steaming undecidedly off Samar for two more hours, he decided to retire and retreated back through the San Bernardino Strait.

His ships were subjected to further air attack the rest of the day and Halsey's battleships just missed catching him that night. Kurita's retreat saved Yamato and the remainder of the IJN 2nd Fleet from certain destruction, but had failed to complete his mission, attacking the amphibious forces in Leyte Gulf. The path had been laid open to him by the sacrifices of the Northern and Southern Forces, but closed again by the determination and courage of the Taffies.

After Leyte and Postwar

Kurita was criticized by some elements in the Japanese military for not fighting to the death. In December, Kurita was removed from command. In order to protect him against assassination, he was re-assigned as commandant of the Imperial Japanese Navy Academy.

Following the Japanese surrender, Kurita found work as a scrivener and masseur, living quietly with his daughter and her family. He never discussed politics or the war with his family or with anyone, except to conduct a brief interview with a journalist, Ito Masanori, in 1954 when he stated that he had made a mistake at Leyte by turning away and not continuing with the battle, a statement he later retracted.

Afterwards, Kurita returned to his retirement, making a twice-yearly pilgrimage to Yasukuni Shrine to pray for his dead comrades-in-arms. In 1966, he was present at the deathbed of his old colleague, Ozawa Jisaburo, at which he silently wept.

It was not until he was in his eighties that Kurita began to admit the truth of his actions at Leyte. He admitted privately to a former Naval Academy student (and biographer), Ooka Jiro, that he withdrew the fleet from the battle because he did not believe in wasting the lives of his men in a futile effort, having long since believed that the war was lost.

Kurita died in 1977 aged 88, and his grave is at the Tama Reien cemetery outside of Tokyo.

Notes

References

Books

* Evan Thomas, "Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign, 1941-1945." New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007. ISBN 0743252217.)
* Cutler, Thomas (2001). The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23–26 October 1944. Annapolis, Maryland, U.S.: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-243-9.
* D'Albas, Andrieu (1965). Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Devin-Adair Pub. ISBN 0-8159-5302-X.
* Dull, Paul S. (1978). A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-097-1.
* Field, James A. (1947). The Japanese at Leyte Gulf;: The Sho operation. Princeton University Press. ASIN|B0006AR6LA.
* Friedman, Kenneth (2001). Afternoon of the Rising Sun: The Battle of Leyte Gulf. Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141-756-7.
* Halsey, William Frederick (1983) The Battle for Leyte Gulf. U.S. Naval Institute ASIN|B0006YBQU8
* Hornfischer, James D. (2004). The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors. Bantam. ISBN 0-553-80257-7.
* Hoyt, Edwin P.; Thomas H Moorer (Introduction) (2003). The Men of the Gambier Bay: The Amazing True Story of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The Lyons Press. ISBN 1-58574-643-6.
* Lacroix, Eric; Linton Wells (1997). Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-311-3.
* Morison, Samuel Eliot (2001) Leyte: June 1944-January 1945 (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume 12. Castle Books; Reprint ISBN 0785813136
* Potter, E. B. (2005). Admiral Arleigh Burke. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-692-5.
* Potter, E. B. (2003). Bull Halsey. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-691-7.
* David Sears. The Last Epic Naval Battle: Voices from Leyte Gulf. Praeger Publishers (2005) ISBN 0275985202
* Thomas, Evan (2006). Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign 1941–1945. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-7432-5221-7.
* Willmott, H. P. (2005). The Battle Of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action. Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-34528-6.
* Woodward, C. Vann (1989) The Battle for Leyte Gulf (Naval Series) Battery Press ISBN 0898391342

External links

*cite web
last = Nishida
first = Hiroshi
url = http://homepage2.nifty.com/nishidah/e/px38.htm#v009
title = Imperial Japanese Navy
accessdate = 2007-02-25
* [www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/IJO/index.html] A list of the U.S. Naval Interrogations of Japanese Officials, conducted after the war, with full texts of the interviews. A number of these interviews are available on line and provide interesting insight from the Japanese commanders, who, many for first time, are openly critical of the war and their superiors. Admiral Kurita and his role in the war is discussed in a number of different interrogations.