Battle of Lang Vei

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Battle of Lang Vei
partof=the Vietnam War


caption=PT-76, communist victory monument
date=6 February - 7 February 1968
place=coord|16|36|35|N|106|41|46|E|type:landmark|display=inline,title|name=Lang Vei
Lang Vei, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam - UTM Grid XD 848-417cite book| last =Kelley| first =Michael P.| title =Where We Were In Vietnam| publisher =Hellgate Press| year =2002| pages = p. 5-289 | id = ISBN 1-55571-625-3 ]
result=North Vietnamese victory.
combatant1=
combatant2=
commander1=Le Cong Phe
commander2=Frank C. Willoughby
strength1=3 Infantry battalions,
2 Sapper companies,
2 Armoured companies. [http://www.vva.org/veteran/0807/khesanh.html]
strength2=500 CIDG Montagnard and 24 U.S. Special Forces personnel
casualties1=90 killed,
220 wounded [http://www.vva.org/veteran/0807/khesanh.html]
casualties2=200+ killed (7 Americans) and
75 wounded (11 Americans)

The Battle of Lang Vei was a battle of the Vietnam War fought on the night of 6 February 1968, between elements of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and the United States-led Detachment A-101, 5th Special Forces Group.

Lang Vei was an American Special Forces camp, located approximately 7 km (4.5 mi) west of the Khe Sanh Combat Base in Quang Tri Province, in the northwestern corner of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN or South Vietnam), near its borders with the DRV and the Kingdom of Laos. The camp was constructed in 1967 for operations of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) along the Laotian frontier. It was overwhelmed by North Vietnamese forces on 7 February 1968. The history of the camp and the battle for the camp are also described in some detail in the article on the Battle of Khe Sanh.

Lang Vei was positioned some nine kilometers (5.5 mi) west of Khe Sanh village on Route Coloniale 9. Known to Americans as Highway 9, this major roadway stretched through Quang Tri Province from Dong Ha on the coast west to Lao Bao, Laos, passing through places such as Cam Lo as well as Khe Sanh. Lang Vei was defended by a force of 500 CIDG Montagnards and 24 U.S. Special Forces personnel.

Background

During the first few weeks of 1968 most activities at Lang Vei were limited to company-sized patrols, in which few contacts were made with the North Vietnamese. The quietness was deceptive since PAVN forces were moving towards the special forces camp.

On 24 January, Captain Frank C. Willoughby, the camp commander, received word from Khe Sanh Combat Base that the 33rd Laotian Elephant Battalion was moving towards his camp at Lang Vei, after PAVN infantry augmented by armour had overrun their camp (BV-33) at Ban Houi Sane. The enemy's use of armour caused some concern for Captain Willoughby, because the Laotian base was only fifteen kilometres (9 mi) away. On the next day, Laotian survivors were allowed to take up positions within the camp, while their civilian dependents settled down in Lang Vei village. In order to help the Laotian refugees in the area, Willoughby requested assistance from Da Nang which came in the form of food, medical supplies, ammunition and other tools to bolster the camp's defences.

On 31 January, a three-platoon patrol dispatched from the camp made contact with the enemy. During the brief firefight with North Vietnamese soldiers, the Mobile Strike Force had one man killed and four others were wounded.

Battle

By early February elements of the North Vietnamese 24th and 101D Infantry Regiments, supported by the 198/202nd Armoured Regiment, were in position and prepared to launch their assault. [http://www.vva.org/veteran/0807/khesanh.html] The camp was subjected to intense mortar and artillery fire, which began at about 18:00 on 6 February. The defenders immediately responded with counter fire from the camp and supporting fire from the Khe Sanh Combat Base.

The PAVN ground assault began before 01:00 in the predawn darkness of the following morning, supported by twelve Soviet-built PT-76 tanks. The first two to reach the protective wire around the camp perimeter were taken under fire and knocked out by recoiless rifle fire, but additional tanks maneuvered around the destroyed vehicles to overrun the defenders of the southern sector. [http://www.vva.org/veteran/0807/khesanh.html]

The camp’s defenders had been warned of a possible armoured attack by earlier intelligence reports and were equipped with LAW rockets. These, together with the camp’s 106-mm and 57-mm recoilless rifles, destroyed another five tanks but they were not able to stop the others. The Special Forces troops and their men made a fighting withdrawal from the perimeter, but were soon surrounded in pockets of resistance. Meanwhile the PAVN forces ranged throughout the camp, utilizing their tanks and explosive charges to destroy fortifications within the camp and to attack the tactical operations centre.

When dawn broke, the defenders in the operations centre called in air strikes against the North Vietnamese and requested the Marines at Khe Sanh to implement their contingency plan to reinforce the camp. Fearing that the attack was part of a larger PAVN scheme to lure out the Marines where they could be ambushed, the commander at Khe Sanh, Colonel David Lownds, decided not to reinforce the camp. At noon General William C. Westmoreland was convinced to allow an evacuation of the surviving defenders and a Special Forces reaction force was dispatched from Khe Sanh with tactical air support.

The extraction took place that afternoon, and by nightfall the camp had been evacuated. The seriously wounded were evacuated by helicopter while the reaction force escorted the remaining survivors and many refugees in a foot march that reached the gates of the Khe Sanh base on the morning of 8 February. Almost half of the defenders had been killed or were missing in action, but the North Vietnamese did not proceed beyond Lang Vei.

Aftermath

The battle for Lang Vei ended in a PAVN victory. Although the North Vietnamese succeeded in overunning the camp, they lost seven tanks along with 90 soldiers killed, and 220 wounded. Psychologically, the Lang Vei's defenders were not prepared for a combined armour/infantry onslaught, but nonetheless, they inflicted heavy casualties on their adversaries. Losses among the 500 CIDG Montagnard defenders were 200 killed in action. Losses among the 24 U.S. defenders were seven killed in action, three POWs, and 11 wounded.

During Operation Dawson River, in 1969, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division, discovered several PAVN supply caches west of Khe Sahn that consisted of a large quantity of arms, ammunition, and equipment that had been captured from the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei [Murphy, Edward F. (1997). "Semper Fi Vietnam: From Danang to the DMZ, Marine Corps Campaigns, 1965-1975".Ballantine Books, New York, pp. 224-225.]

ee also

*Battle of Ban Houei Sane

Notes

References

*cite book
last =Stockwell
first =David B.
authorlink =
coauthors =
title =Tanks In The Wire! - The First Use Of Enemy Armor In Vietnam
publisher =Penguin
year =1989
location =
pages =
url =
doi =
id = ISBN 0515-1033-30

External links

* [http://www.vva.org/veteran/0807/khesanh.html Khe Sanh: The Other Side Of The Hill]
* [http://ehistory.osu.edu/vietnam/books/7firefights/0111.cfm Battle of Lang Vei]
* [http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/7-ff/Ch6.htm Battle of Lang Vei by John A. Crash]
* [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=8594 Lang Vei: Tanks In The Wire]
* [http://www.langvei.com/ LangVei.com, a website by American veterans of Lang Vei] .