Strickland v. Washington

SCOTUSCase
Litigants=Strickland v. Washington
ArgueDate=January 10
ArgueYear=1984
DecideDate=May 14
DecideYear=1984
FullName=Strickland, Superintendent, Florida State Prison, v. Washington
USVol=466
USPage=668
Citation=466 U.S. 668; 104 S. Ct. 2052; 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)
Prior=Writ of habeas corpus denied by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida; reversed by the Eleventh Circuit, 693 F.2d 1243 (11th Cir. 1982); cert. granted, 462 U.S. 1105 (1983)
Subsequent=
Holding=To obtain relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel's deficient performance gives rise to a reasonable probability that, if counsel had performed adequately, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
SCOTUS=1981-1986
Majority=O'Connor
JoinMajority=Burger, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens
Concurrence/Dissent=Brennan
Dissent=Marshall
LawsApplied=Sixth Amendment

In "Strickland v. Washington", ussc|466|668|1984, the United States Supreme Court established a two-part test for establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under this test, a criminal defendant may not obtain relief unless he can show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that counsel's performance gives rise to a reasonable probability that, if counsel had performed adequately, the result of the proceeding—the trial, the sentencing hearing, the appeal—would have been different.

Facts

In 1976, Washington committed three brutal stabbing murders, kidnapping, attempted murder, and theft. His two accomplices were arrested, and then Washington surrendered and gave a lengthy statement to the police confessing to the kidnapping and one of the murders. Washington was indicted in Florida for those crimes, and an experienced criminal defense attorney was appointed to represent him.

Washington did not follow his lawyer's advice, and later confessed to the other two murders. Eventually, also against the advice of counsel, Washington pleaded guilty to all of the crimes, with the result that he was eligible for the death penalty. This meant that there would be a sentencing hearing before a judge, who would hear evidence in support of and in opposition to a death sentence.

Counsel began gathering information about Washington's background. Counsel spoke with Washington's wife and mother, but did not personally meet with either of them. Counsel found no other character witnesses for Washington. He also did not request a psychiatric examination, because his conversations with Washington did not suggest to him that Washington might have psychological problems. At this point, counsel abandoned his investigation of Washington's background—a decision that "reflected trial counsel's sense of hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of [Washington's] confessions to the gruesome crimes." In part, this was also a strategic decision on counsel's part, since the testimony of the hearing at which Washington had pleaded guilty would provide ample evidence about the crimes themselves, and counsel did not want to give the State a chance to cross-examine Washington on the stand about the details of the crimes at the sentencing hearing.

Counsel's strategy for the sentencing hearing was based on the trial judge's remarks. He urged Washington to express remorse for his crimes. Counsel also pointed to Washington's lack of prior criminal history and emotional stress at the time of the crimes. Counsel offered these facts to support his argument for a life sentence. But the trial judge found much in the way of aggravation, including the brutality of the crimes, and only one mitigating factor, Washington's lack of prior criminal history. The trial judge sentenced Washington to death for each of the three murders. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences on direct appeal.

Washington then sought collateral relief in the Florida state courts. He argued that counsel was inadequate in preparing for the sentencing hearing. He argued counsel should have asked for more time to prepare for the hearing, requested a psychiatric report, uncovered and presented more character witnesses, sought a pre-sentence investigation report, presented more meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and investigated and cross-examined the medical examiner's reports. The Florida courts rejected these arguments, reasoning that the "aggravating circumstances [were] completely overwhelming," and so nothing counsel could have done would have avoided the death sentences.

Washington then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, raising the same claims for ineffective assistance of counsel. The federal district court held a hearing, but ultimately agreed with the facts as found by the Florida state courts. It ruled that whatever errors counsel may have made in investigating Washington's case for a life sentence, there was no significant likelihood that the trial court would have imposed a life sentence. The federal court of appeals, sitting "en banc", reversed, crafting its own test for ineffective assistance of counsel under which the defendant had to show "actual and substantial disadvantage" to his case before obtaining relief. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for consideration under this standard, but before the district court could do so, the State asked the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case. The Court agreed to do so.

Majority opinion

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel "exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial." A fair trial is one in which "evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding." Criminal defendants require counsel's skill and knowledge in order to be able to successfully rebuff the State's attempt to imprison or execute them. Accordingly, the Court has ruled that counsel must be appointed for criminal defendants if they cannot afford to hire their own counsel. But the fact that "a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused... is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command." Counsel must play the role in the adversarial system that allows the system to produce just results. Hence, the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

A claim that counsel was ineffective, then, has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was "deficient," such that counsel's errors were "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Second, this deficient performance must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Without these two showings, "it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable."

In order to show that counsel's performance was "deficient," the defendant must show that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness." The legal profession is capable of maintaining standards that justify the law's presumption that counsel ordinary serves his function in the adversary system. This includes such basic duties as assisting the defendant and showing him undivided loyalty by representing him unburdened by any conflict of interest. Counsel should advocate the defendant's case, consult with the defendant on the important decisions and keep him informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution. But these basic duties do not serve as a "checklist" for counsel, for "no particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant." Counsel must have "wide latitude" to make "reasonable tactical decisions," lest the requirements for constitutionally effective assistance distract counsel from "the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause." Judges who evaluate ineffective assistance claims should, in turn, be highly deferential to counsel's decisions and avoid scrutinizing them in hindsight. Harsh scrutiny would encourage the proliferation of ineffective assistance claims and "dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel."

Counsel does, however, have a duty to make "reasonable investigations, or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." After all, strategic decisions made in light of a reasonable investigation and compared to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable. By contrast, strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable only to the extent that reasonable professional judgments justify the curtailment of counsel's investigation. These judgments may be informed by statements the defendant himself makes to counsel and the effects of previous strategic choices.

But not all errors on counsel's part justify setting aside the judgment; rather, they must "prejudice" the defendant's ability to receive a fair trial. In certain circumstances, such as when the defendant has had no counsel at all or when counsel has labored under a conflict of interest, the Court will presume prejudice. But ordinarily, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance had an adverse effect on the defense. Since the goal is to ensure that the defendant had a fair trial, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. When the defendant challenges his conviction, this means he must show that counsel's errors prevented the jury from forming a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. When he challenges a death sentence, as Washington is doing, he must show a reasonable probability that the sentencer would have balanced the aggravation and mitigation evidence differently. These assessments must be made, of course, with respect to the totality of the evidence presented at the hearing, so that when the prosecution's case is weak, the defendant will more easily show prejudice.

Applying this test to Washington's case, the Court concluded that counsel did not perform deficiently and that Washington suffered no prejudice. Counsel's decision to focus on remorse and emotional distress was a reasonable strategic decision in light of the trial judge's stated views on remorse, the heinousness of Washington's crimes, and Washington's own statements to counsel. In view of these considerations, the Court could not conclude that additional mitigating evidence would have given rise to a reasonable probability that the trial judge would have sentenced Washington to life in prison rather than death.

Justice Brennan concurred in the result because he believed that the Court's new test for ineffective assistance, particularly the prejudice prong, would not impede the presentation of mitigating evidence on behalf of capital defendants. "Counsel's general duty to investigate... takes on supreme importance to a defendant in the context of developing mitigating evidence to present to a judge or jury considering the sentence of death; claims of ineffective assistance in the performance of that duty should therefore be considered with commensurate care." However, because Justice Brennan believed that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment, he would have vacated Washington's death sentence and remanded for further proceedings.

Dissenting opinion

Justice Marshall dissented from the majority's holding. He objected that the Court's newly crafted test was unlikely to "improve the adjudication of Sixth Amendment claims." In his view, the performance standard was "so malleable that, in practice, it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts." What does "reasonable" mean? Should counsel's performance be judged by reference to a reasonable "paid" attorney or a reasonable "appointed" one? After all, Marshall pointed out, "a person of means, by selecting a lawyer and paying him enough to ensure he prepares thoroughly, usually can obtain better representation than that available to an indigent defendant, who must rely on appointed counsel, who, in turn, has limited time and resources to devote to a given case." Marshall also disputed that counsel's performance must be given especially wide latitude, since "much of the work involved in preparing for trial, applying for bail, conferring with one's client, making timely objections to significant, arguably erroneous rulings of the trial judge, and filing a notice of appeal if there are colorable grounds therefor could profitably be made the subject of uniform standards."

Marshall also disputed that it should be made the defendant's burden to show prejudice from an allegedly incompetent attorney's performance. Nor should prejudice be measured solely with respect to the fairness of the "outcome" of the trial; the fairness of the "procedure" matters just as much. "The majority contends that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a manifestly guilty defendant is convicted after a trial in which he was represented by a manifestly ineffective attorney. I cannot agree."

Marshall worried that the Court's admonition to future judges, presented with ineffective assistance claims should defer to counsel's strategic judgments, placed too heavy a burden on defendants making such claims.

Finally, Marshall took issue with the Court's conclusion that the same standard for ineffectiveness should apply in a capital sentencing proceeding that applies at an ordinary trial. The capital sentencing process is intended to be especially reliable, and "reliability in the imposition of the death sentence can be approximated only if the sentencer is fully informed of all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine." The defendant's attorney is responsible for doing this. For this reason, and in light of the "severity and irrevocability of the sanction at stake," the standard for effective assistance in capital sentencing proceedings must be especially stringent. Accordingly, Marshall believed that a person on death row seeking relief from his death sentence on grounds of ineffective assistance should not have to show a reasonable probability that he would not have received a death sentence if counsel had presented more mitigating evidence. Because it was clear that Washington's attorney had failed to investigate and then present large amounts of information to the sentencing judge, Marshall concluded that Washington's lawyer was ineffective.

ee also

*List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 466
*Wiggins v. Smith

External links

* [http://laws.findlaw.com/us/466/668.html Text of the opinion, findlaw.com]
* [http://www.oyez.org/cases/case/?case=1980-1989/1983/1983_82_1554 Link to audio of oral argument, OYEZ project]