- Handan Campaign
Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Handan Campaign
partof=Chinese Civil War
place=Handan ,Hebei ,China
date=October 22 ,1945 -November 2 ,1945
result=Communist victory
combatant1=
combatant2=
commander1= Gao Shuxun 高树勋
commander2=flagicon|China|armyLiu Bocheng
flagicon|China|armyDeng Xiaoping
strength1= 45,000 for the 1st echelon
100,000 for the 2nd echelon
strength2= 60,000 regular
100,000 militia
casualties1= 3,000 killed
17,000 captured alive
10,000 defected
casualties2= 4,708 total|Handan Campaign (邯郸战役), also known as Pinghan Campaign (平汉战役), short for Beiping-Hankou Campaign (北平汉口战役), is one of the largest clashes between the
communist force and the nationalist force immediately after the end ofWorld War II , which resulted incommunist victory.
=Nationalist Strategy=During the
Shangdang Campaign ,communist units of theShanxi -Hebei -Shandong -Henan (晋冀鲁豫) Military Region succeeded in taking control over a 200km section of the railway fromBeijing toHankou , and the adjacent regions along this section. Their nationalist enemy were determined to dislodge thecommunist force from their newly gained territory and planned an offensive that would significantly boost the nationalist bargaining chips in the peace negotiation with thecommunist opponent.The nationalist side deployed around 145,000 troops in two echelons, and the first echelon is mainly consisted of three armies from the 11th War Zone to strike northward from
Xinxiang in two fronts: the nationalist left front was consisted of the Newly Organized 8th Army and the 30th Army, while the nationalist right front was consisted of the 40th Army and the 9th Combat Engineering Regiment.The second echelon was also consisted of two fronts: In the south, the nationalist 32nd Army of the 11th War Zone would follow the 40th Army to
Anyang , and then would continue and linkup with the 3rd Army and the 16th Army of the nationalist 1st War Zone atShijiazhuang . One the three armies had jointed their forces, they would continue push northward and linkup with the 92nd Army and 94th Army, which would strike southward fromBeijing , where these two nationalist armies were previously airlifted to the ancient city.When the link up is completed, the previously
communist occupied territory would be firmly back into the nationalist hands. The nationalist success of the offensive would also secure the passage tonortheast China and guarantee the control of northernChina . The commander of the nationalist 40th Army, Ma Fawu (马法五), was also the commander-in-chief of the 11th War Zone, while the commander of the nationalist Newly Organized 8th Army, Gao Shuxun (高树勋), was also the deputy commander-in-chief of the 11th War Zone, and they were in charge of the entire operation.Communist StrategyThe
communist s plan was to concentrate a total of 60,000 regular army troops from the 1st Column, the 2nd Column, the 3rd Column, and units of Taihang (太行) Military Region,Hebei -Shandong -Henan (Ji-Lu-Yu, 冀鲁豫) Military Region, and SouthernHebei (Ji-Nan, 冀南) Military Region to annihilate the enemy at the Fuyang (滏阳) region north the Zhang River (漳河), and south ofHandan , with the help of another 100,000communist militia. The strategy was to proceed in several phases:At the beginning,
communist units of the Taihang (太行) Military Region, units ofHebei -Shandong -Henan (Ji-Lu-Yu, 冀鲁豫) Military Region and local militia would destroy railways from the north ofYellow River toAnyang , and harass the enemy to provide time for othercommunist s to group. After the enemy has crossed the Zhang River (漳河), a detachment of thecommunist force would immediately control the river crossing point, and thus cutoff the link between the enemy units atAnyang and that had crossed the Zhang River (漳河). The enemy units that had crossed the Zhang River (漳河) would then be lured into the regions south ofHandan and north of Zhang River (漳河) to be ambushed in the pre-selected spot. The enemy would be annihilated in a pincer movement that is consisted of two fronts: the eastern front would be consisted of thecommunist 1st Column and units ofHebei -Shandong -Henan (Ji-Lu-Yu, 冀鲁豫) Military Region, while the western front would be consisted of thecommunist 2nd Column, 3rd Column, units from Taihang (太行) Military Region and SouthernHebei (Ji-Nan, 冀南) Military Region.Prelude
The nationalists begun their push on
October 14 ,1945 . However, majority of the officers and soldiers of the Newly Organized 8th Army, the most capable fighting unit of the nationalist force and thus tasked to bear the brunt of the fighting, were extremely resentful toChiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime. The reason was that the troops originally belonged toGuominjun clique of warlords, but later defected toChiang Kai-shek . Unlike many warlords who collaborated with the Japanese invaders during theSecond Sino-Japanese War and then rejoined the nationalist regime afterWorld War II , these troops remained firmly on the Chinese side throughout the conflict. Furthermore, unlike other warlords who stayed on the Chinese side during the conflict but were not under the direct control ofChiang Kai-shek and remained independent instead, such as the case ofYan Xishan ,Ma clique ,New Guangxi Clique , andSichuan clique , these troops were directly under control ofChiang Kai-shek and his regime, just like Chiang’s own troops.However, these troops of former
Guominjun felt that their loyalty was not rewarded accordingly and they were discriminated against byChiang Kai-shek and troops of his own clique. Such sentiment was certainly true becauseChiang Kai-shek had planned to solve the warlord problem that had plagued China for so long together with the eradication of thecommunism , which proved to be a fatal mistake. These former warlords’s troops believed thatChiang Kai-shek and his regime felt that they were expandable and used them just as tools of the civil war because instead of sending his crack troops such as the Newly Organized 1st Army,Chiang Kai-shek only send the second-rate troops to fight alongside with them, and moreover, it were them who bore the brunt of the fights instead Chiang’s own troops. Such resentment againstChiang Kai-shek and his regime was exploited to the maximum by theircommunist enemy in the latter stage of theHandan Campaign, resulting in their defection to thecommunist side, which proved to be a significant factor that contributed to the nationalist failure. To complete their plan, manycommunist agents had already infiltrated the Newly Organized 8th Army prior to the campaign.Order of battle Nationalist
order of battle 1st Echelon: 7 Divisions with 45,000 troops
*Newly Organized 8th Army deployed atXinxiang
*The 30th Army deployed atXinxiang
*The 40th Army deployed atXinxiang 2nd Echelon: 100,000 troops
*The 3rd Army deployed atShijiazhuang
*The 16th Army deployed atShijiazhuang
*The 32nd Army deployed atAnyang
*The 92nd Army deployed atBeijing
*The 94th Army deployed atBeijing Communist order of battle 60,000 regulars:
*The 1st Column
*The 2nd Column
*The 3rd Column
*Units of Taihang (太行) Military Region
*Units ofHebei -Shandong -Henan (Ji-Lu-Yu, 冀鲁豫) Military Region
*Units of SouthernHebei (Ji-Nan, 冀南) Military RegionAnother 100,000 militiaFirst Stage
By
October 20 ,1945 , the nationalist advance guards had occupied the positions at shore of Zhang River (漳河), covering the troops building the bridges at the crossing point. OnOctober 22 ,1945 , the nationalist force had crossed the Zhang River (漳河), where they were met head on with thecommunist 1st Column deployed south ofHandan , and the first shot of the campaign had been fired. ByOctober 24 ,1945 , all three nationalist armies had cross the Zhang River (漳河), and under the heavy artillery bombardment, the 106th Division of the nationalist 40th Army assaulted the position of the 1st Brigade of thecommunist 1st Column, succeeding in breaking through after a day of fierce fighting, penetrating thecommunist defense at region between Cuiqu (崔曲)、Jiati (夹堤), and by the evening, had successfully pushed to Village of Gao (Gozhuang, 高庄)、Nanpozi (南泊子) line. Unbeknown to the nationalist force, thecommunist force was luring them into their trap, and northern group and the southern group had already begun to encircle the enemy from three directions: south ofHandan , west of Magnetic County (Cixian, 磁县) and east of Horse Head Town (Matouzhen, 马头镇).When the nationalist force had reached the Magnetic County (Cixian, 磁县) and the Horse Head Town (Matouzhen, 马头镇), the
communist encirclement was complete, while at the same time, the river crossing of Zhang River (漳河) had also fallen into thecommunist hands. Realizing that they were surrounded, the besieged nationalist force retreated toward North and South Zuoliang (左良) and Cuiqu (崔曲), and directly appealed toChiang Kai-shek for help via radio.Chiang Kai-shek , in turned, ordered the entire second echelon to be mobilized to help the besieged first echelon by sending everyone available. However, the nationalist commanders of the second echelon were reluctant and more importantly, impossible to devote their force 100%, and instead, only send small detachments. OnOctober 26 ,1945 , a portion of the nationalist 16th Army were sent fromShijiazhuang , but they were stopped by thecommunist units of the Taihang (太行) Military Region and other local militia units at Gaoyi (高邑). Meanwhile, the nationalist 32nd Army atAnyang sent out a detachment to reinforce their besieged comrade-in-arms, but this reinforcement from the south was also stopped by thecommunist force at Zhang River (漳河).econd Stage
At the dusk of
October 28 ,1945 , the full scale attack on the besieged nationalist force begun. Thecommunist northern group targeted the nationalist 40th Army while avoiding direct confrontation with the nationalist Newly Organized 8th Army. ByOctober 30 ,1945 , the 106th Division of the nationalist 40th Army was nearly wiped out, and the nationalist 30th Army was also badly mauled. Meanwhile, thecommunist chief of staff Li Da (李达) personally went to the headquarter of the nationalist Newly Organized 8th Army and successfully convinced its commander, the deputy commander-in-chief of the 11th War Zone, Gao Shuxun (高树勋) to defect to thecommunist side. The defection of the most capable fighting unit of the nationalist force struck a devastating blow on the nationalist morale and worsened the situation for the remaining besieged nationalist units. Sensing the opportunity, thecommunist commanderLiu Bocheng ordered thecommunist 1st Column and 3rd Column to open up the southern front and set a new trap along the road to lure out the besieged nationalist units from their strongholds.On
October 31 ,1945 , the nationalist force escaped thru the opening in the south exactly as theircommunist enemy had expected, and was besieged at regions along the Flagpole Zhang (Qigan Zhang, 旗杆漳)、Xin Village (Xin Zhuang, 辛庄)、and Horse Camp (Ma Ying, 马营) line when thecommunist units of the Taihang (太行) Military Region and units ofHebei -Shandong -Henan (Ji-Lu-Yu, 冀鲁豫) Military Region stopped them at the northern shore of Zhang River (漳河). OnNovember 1 ,1945 , a detachment of thecommunist 1st Column had taken the headquarter of the nationalist 40th Army at Flagpole Zhang (Qigan Zhang, 旗杆漳), capturing the nationalist commander-in-chief Ma Fawu (马法五) alive and the nationalist resistance ceased completely by the next day, while the nationalist reinforcement on the road immediately withdraw back to their fortified positions behind the city walls upon hearing the new. The campaign ended on theNovember 2 ,1945 .Outcome
The
communist victory ofHandan Campaign was another heavy blow to the nationalist afterShangdang Campaign , and strengthened thecommunist position in the peace negotiation. Furthermore, thecommunist victory had significantly slowed the nationalist deployment along the railway fromBeijing toHankou and thus provided cover for othercommunist forces to proceed tonortheast China .The most obvious nationalist debacle was
Chiang Kai-shek ’s attempt to solve the warlord problem that had plagued China for so long together with the eradication of thecommunism by reducing the warlords’ power via reducing their military strength, which proved to be a fatal mistake, resulting in nationalist units defecting to thecommunist side. However, even Chiang’scommunist adversary had admitted that Chiang could not and should not be excessively blamed for this because nobody else could do any better, including thecommunist s themselves, had their positions being switched with that of Chiang and his nationalist regime, becauseChiang Kai-shek was faced with a huge dilemma: for these troops, the only way to survive was to serve in the armed forces, and if these warlords’ troops were not expanded in battles but discharged in peacetime demilitarization, they would be forced to join thecommunist camp for survival anyway when they were out of jobs, as later proved in places such asnortheast China . When these experienced combat veterans with experience with modern weaponry joined thecommunist force that was mostly illiterate peasantry army, the combat capability of thecommunist force would be and had been significantly boosted, and obviously anyone would rather want them perished in fights against the enemy instead of helping the enemy when these troops were to be demilitarized, andChiang Kai-shek was no exception.Even if
Chiang Kai-shek had not made the fatal mistake of attempting to solve the warlord problem that had plagued China for so long together with the eradication of thecommunism , the nationalist offensive was destined to fail from the very beginning because Chiang and his nationalist regime had made an even greater fatal mistake: launching an offensive too early with insufficient strength. As Chiang had soon painfully realized, the nationalist regime simply did not have enough resource to deploy its troops in very short time span in the vast regions ofChina . When the surrounding countryside was dominated by the opposingcommunist force, launching an offensive of the scale ofHandan Campaign with what was currently available for the nationalist side was simply unrealistically overambitious. EvenChiang Kai-shek ’scommunist adversary did not blame on the nationalist second echelon for not succeeding in rescue their besieged comrade-in-arms, because they were too far away, and in fact, the reinforcement sent by the nationalist 92nd Army and the 94th Army fromBeijing did not even met any enemy before the they were turned back due to the end of the campaign, achieving nothing except wasting valuable supply. These nationalist commanders were loyal officers of troops ofChiang Kai-shek ’s own clique and thus even theircommunist enemy did not accuse them of being warlords’ troops who were reluctant to carry out Chiang’s order. In fact, these commanders of the nationalist second echelon made a correct decision in only sending out detachments for reinforcement instead of everyone as they were ordered because they were already dangerously overstretched in regions surrounded by the enemy from countryside, and if everyone was sent out as ordered, then not only the urban centers would risk being taken over by the enemy due to the undermanned defense, those on the road would also risk being annihilated, not mentioning the fact that the great distance would mean the reinforcement would never be able to reach its destination in time. Therefore, the correct decision made by the commanders of the nationalist second echelon had succeeded in preserve the nationalist force of the second echelon, which was almost unscratched. The successful preservation of the force, in turn, would help the nationalist regime later to buy time for troop deployment and strengthening the nationalist positions.ee also
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*National Revolutionary Army
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