Arab Islamic Republic

The Arab Islamic Republic was a proposed unification of Tunisia and Libya in 1974, agreed upon by Libyan ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi and Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba. The proposal was never implemented.

Regional Context

The attempted merger between Tunisia and Libya must be viewed within its historical and regional context. Looking to the west, the Arab Islamic Republic must be viewed under the rubric of Maghribi regional politics. Embedded into the constitutions of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria is the ideal of Maghrebi unity [Aghrout, A. & Sutton, K. (1990). Regional Economic Union in the Maghrib. "The Journal of Modern African Studies", 28(1), 115] , however contradicting this ideal is the competing interests of Morocco and Algeria, the region's two major powers. According to one Tunisian Scholar, “if there were only Algerian and not Morocco, or Morocco and not Algeria, there could never have been a Maghrib. The major power would have swallowed us all up. To have the Maghrib you need those two rival powers competing with each other in the region” [Deeb, M. J. (1989). Inter-Maghribi Relations Since 1969: A Study of the Modalities of Unions and Mergers. "Middle East Journal, 43"(1), 22] . Thus attempts at unification within the Maghrib were more often than not the means by which to counter balance one or both of the regions major powers.

Additionally, one must also consider the impact of Pan-Arabism and the politics of the greater Arab world. Muammar al-Qaddafi is a well known proponent of Pan-Arabism and thus has worked to achieve union with several Arab states such as Egypt, Syria, Chad, Sudan and Tunisia. Thus, in a 1972 rally in Tunis, al-Qaddafi spoke of supporting a union between Libya and Tunisia [Wright, J. 1981. "Libya: A Modern History". London: Croom Helm, 165] . Hearing the speech by Qaddafi live at his home over the radio, President Bourgiba rushed to the rally where after he let Qaddafi finish, he took to the stage and denounced the idea that “the Arabs had ever been united, dismissed all of [Qaddafi’s] ideas about rapid Arab unity, and even took the Libyans to task for what he described as their own lack of national unity and their backwardness” [Wright, J. 1981. "Libya: A Modern History". London: Croom Helm, 165] . That being said, close Libyan-Egyptian ties troubled Maghribi leaders who feared the proximity of Egypt on their eastern boarders and thus worked to pull Libya away from Egyptian influence [Deeb, M. J. (1989). Inter-Maghribi Relations Since 1969: A Study of the Modalities, Unions and Mergers. "Middle East Journal", 43(1), 23] . At the fourth annual Non-Alignment Movement conference in Algiers, Bourguiba called for the unification of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, a move which he qualified by proposing it take place in stages over an “unspecified period of time.” [Deeb, M. J. (1989). Inter-Maghribi Relations Since 1969: A Study of the Modalities of Unions and Mergers. "Middle East Journal", 43(1), 24]

The Djerba Declaration

On January 11, 1974, the Djerba Declaration was signed by Bourgiba and Qaddafi, which committed the two states to becoming a single state, to be named the Arab Islamic Republic. [Simons, G. 1993. "Libya: The struggle for Survival". New York: St. Martin’s Press, 253] The agreement was signed on the Island of Djerba (or Jerba) and thus, is also known as the Djerba Declaration [Simons, G. 1993. "Libya: The struggle for Survival". New York: St. Martin’s Press, 253] or the Djerba Accord. Referendums were scheduled in each country to vote on the issue. The spontaneous tactic in trying to gain unity with another state on the part of Qaddafi displays a different approach than the previous union attempt with Egypt, where long negotiations did not work out. [Wright, J. 1981. "Libya: A Modern History". London: Croom Helm, 165.] Conversely, as has been mentioned before, it is possible that Bourgiba was the original pursuant of a union between Libya and Tunisia, as Tunisian wanted a regional ally and also wanted to “wean Libya away form Egypt.” [Deeb, M. J. “Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” in "The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa. 4th ed". David E. Long and Bernard Reich eds. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 386. http://books.google.ca/books?id=r2ArLdzYH_kC&printsec=copyright&dq=%22arab+islamic+republic%22&source=gbs_toc_s&cad=1#PPR4,M1 (April 4, 2008).]

The union agreement was a surprise to observers, as previously it was thought that Bourgiba had not supported the idea, in part due to tensions brought about by the speech by Qaddafi in Tunis in December 1972. This change in support could also have been influenced by the presence of 30,000 Tunisians working in Libya at the time and helping the Tunisian economy. [Simons, G. 1993. "Libya: The struggle for Survival." New York: St. Martin’s Press, 253.] As Tunisia suffered from a labour surplus, a foreign debt of one billion and a lack of natural resources, a closer economic union with the resource rich but labour poor Libya would have been an attractive alternative. [Broken Engagement, January 28th, 1974, "Time Magazine", http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,911064-2,00.html] . Why Bourgiba decided to agree to the union is not completely known, but it is known that the Djerba agreement was seen with suspicion by Tunisians and Algerians, as well as outside these states both regionally and internationally. [Wright, J. 1981. "Libya: A Modern History". London: Croom Helm, 165.]

The Arab Islamic Republic was supposed to have “a single constitution, a single army, and a single President.” [Simons, G. 1993. "Libya: The struggle for Survival". New York: St. Martin’s Press, 253.] Under the agreement, Bourgiba was to be President, but Qaddafi wanted to keep the Ministry of Defence. [El-Kikhia, M. O. 1997. "Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction". Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 121] Prior to the Djerba Declaration multiple agreements dealing with singular, separate issues had previously been arranged between the two states on “trade, customs duties, investment, regulation for migrant workers, social security, and the creation of a joint shipping company,” [Simons, G. 1993. "Libya: The struggle for Survival". New York: St. Martin’s Press, 253.] but the agreements were not publicly noted as pursuing a union of the two states. Support for the unity beyond Bourgiba came from others within the Tunisian government, thinking that it would further benefit the Tunisian economy; the most prominent supporter was Tunisian Foreign Minister Mohammed Masmoudi. [Simons, G. 1993. "Libya: The struggle for Survival". New York: St. Martin’s Press, 253.]

The length of time the union lasted is contentious, with one source saying it lasted one month, while another says it lasted only a single day and a third indicating it lasted a few days. [El-Kikhia, M. O. 1997. "Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction". Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 21. ; Simons, G. 1993. "Libya: The struggle for Survival". New York: St. Martin’s Press, 254. ; Wright, J. 1981. "Libya: A Modern History". London: Croom Helm, 166.] What is known though is that Tunisia reconsidered the deal soon after signing it, as Tunisia was supportive of economic benefits gained from the union, but not for giving up Tunisian sovereignty. [Simons, G. 1993. "Libya: The struggle for Survival". New York: St. Martin’s Press, 254.] Thus, as the Tunisian Socialist Destour Party resisted the union plans due to their view that the arrangement was not clear enough and did not include how political institutions would be structured, Bourgiba rescinded on his decision to form the Arab Islamic Republic. [Simons, G. 1993. "Libya: The struggle for Survival". New York: St. Martin’s Press, 254.] The referendum in Tunisia was postponed, as announced on January 12, 1974. Following Bourgiba’s removal of Tunisia from the agreement, the biggest supporter of the union, Tunisian Foreign Minister Masmoudi was fired. [Simons, G. 1993. "Libya: The struggle for Survival". New York: St. Martin’s Press, 254.]

Before the agreement was dissolved, Qaddafi had thought that one merger within the region would leave to regional unification and ultimately unification of the Arab world. [Wright, J. 1981. "Libya: A Modern History". London: Croom Helm, 166.] Following the union's inception and fallout, Bourgiba’s judgement and capacity to lead Tunisia was questioned after he announced the union with Libya. [Borowiec, A. 1998. "Modern Tunisia: A Democratic Apprenticeship". Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 34.] Bechir Ben Yahmed, a Tunisian journalist noted, “For me, he [Bourigba] died in January, 1974, in Djerba, when during several minutes of face-to-face with [Qaddafi] , he signed, on hotel stationary, that famous charter of union.” [Borowiec, A. 1998. "Modern Tunisia: A Democratic Apprenticeship". Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 34]

Failure of the Djerba Declaration

Although it is unknown why exactly the Djerba Declaration dissipated before even being put to referendum, several theories have been put forth. To begin, there were fundamental ideological differences between the way in which Tunisia and Libya were governed. Bourguiba’s Tunisia was a committed to liberalization and the secularization of Tunisia, modeled after the French colonial example. Education was a top priority for him, as were women’s rights, state-run health care, and building the country’s infrastructure. For these reasons he has been compared to Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Qaddafi, on the other hand, ran a more Fundamentalist Islamic state. He did not want the secularization and westernization of his nation, and he was politically very anti-Western.

As a consequence of the ideological differences, there was also a considerable divergence as to what the merger would look like. As understood by Bourguiba, the states themselves would not dissipate, but rather their borders would become “cooperatively permeable” through “functional integration,” [Zartman, I. W. (1987). Foreign Relations of North Africa. "International Affairs in Africa" (Jan), 18.] in a similar manner to the contemporary Arab Maghrib Union, formed over a decade later. Conversely, Qaddafi was more interested in a complete merging of Libya and Tunisia into the Arab Islamic Republic. He saw Libya as a revolutionary movement rather than a territorial state. Qaddafi felt that they were one people, and that the borders were only a product of the ruling elites and imperialist divides by conquerors. [Zartman, I. W. (1987). Foreign Relations of North Africa. "International Affairs in Africa" (Jan), 18.]

Finally, there were the regional political difficulties. As has been mentioned before, Libyan-Egyptian relations were steadily deteriorating following 1973. In light of the reduced Egyptian threat, Algeria felt it no longer necessary and even undesirable to merge with Libya and was not in favour of Tunisia doing so either. [Deeb, M. J. (1989). Inter-Maghribi Relations Since 1969: A Study of the Modalities of Unions and Mergers. "Middle East Journal, 43"(1), 26.] Thus, within twenty four hours of the Republic’s announcement, Algeria threatened Tunisia with military intervention if Tunisia went ahead with the unification. [Deeb, M. J. (1989). Inter-Maghribi Relations Since 1969: A Study of the Modalities of Unions and Mergers. "Middle East Journal, 43"(1), 25] There were also accusations of Tunisian foreign ministers being bribed by Libya. Whatever the case may be, the unification of Libya never ended up happening and relations between the two countries steadily deteriorated.

See also

* Arab Maghreb Union, an economic and political union between Maghreb states
* Federation of Arab Republics, a weak union between Libya, Egypt, and Syria around the same time
* Pan-Arabism

References

External links

* [http://i33.servimg.com/u/f33/11/77/56/82/image510.jpgNewspaper bulletin for the Referendum on the Arab Islamic Republic]

* [http://www.african.gu.se/maho/miscmaps/air.html Map of the Arabic Islamic Republic]