- Convoy HX-79
, HMS|Heliotrope|K03|2, HMS|Coreopsis|K32|2, and HMS|Arabis|K73|2; and armed
naval trawler s, a minesweeper and asubmarine .Action
Undeterred by their presence however, the pack attacked as night fell; using the darkness to cover an approach on the surface, Prien penetrated the escort screen from the south to attack from within the convoy, while Endrass (who had learned his trade as Prien’s 1st officer), did the same from the north.
Over the next six hours, 13 ships were torpedoed; 6 by U-47 alone (4 of which were sunk). 10 ships were sunk from the convoy, and 2 stragglers were lost later in the day. These were "Shirak", which had been torpedoed in the night, and "Loch Lomond", sailing with the convoy as a
rescue ship .Another, "Athelmonarch", was damaged but was able to make port.HX 79 had lost 12 ships out of 49, a total tonnage of GRT|75,069|first=yes.
None of the attacking U-boats were damaged.
The blackest days
Of the 63 ships (GRT|352,407) lost in October 1940, more than half (32 ships) were lost from SC 7 and HX 79; and most of those (28 ships) on just two days.Altogether, the 18th and
19th October 1940 constitute the worst days shipping losses of the war.Conclusion
Despite the strength of the escort, it was ineffective; the ships were un-co-ordinated, being unused to working together, and having no common battle plan or tactics.The escorts had arrived singly, being dispatched as and when available, this being the common practice at the time. Command of the escort force fell to the senior officer present, and could change as each new ship arrived. Any tactical arrangements had to be made on the spot, and communicated by
signal lamp to each ship in turn.Finally, the presence of an allied submarine was less than helpful; "O-14" had no targets, and was twice attacked by mistake by other escorts.The failure of such a substantial escort led to a number of changes in escort policy. The first to take effect was the formation of escort groups, collections of escort ships that would operate together, under defined leadership. This would allow the development of consistent tactics, and teamwork, and an increasing effectiveness.
External links
* [http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/hx/index.html?hx.php?convoy=79!~hxmain HX 79 at convoyweb]
*http://uboat.net/ops/convoys/convoys.php?convoy=HX-79References
* Paul Lund, Harry Ludlam : The Night of the U-Boats ( 1973). ISBN 0 572 00828 7
*Stephen Roskill : The War at Sea 1939-1945 Vol I (1954). ISBN (none)
* Dan van der Vat : The Atlantic Campaign (1988). ISBN 0 340 37751 8
* Arnold Hague : The Allied Convoy System 1939-1945 (2000). ISBN (Canada) 1 55125 033 0 . ISBN (UK) 1 86176 147 3
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