Bomber gap

The "bomber gap" was the unfounded belief in the Cold War-era United States that the Soviet Union had gained an advantage in deploying jet-powered strategic bombers. Widely accepted for several years, the gap was used as a political talking point in order to justify greatly increased defense spending. One result was a massive buildup of the United States Air Force bomber fleet, which peaked at over 2,500 bombers, in order to counter the perceived Soviet threat. Surveillance flights utilizing the Lockheed U-2 aircraft indicated that the bomber gap did not exist. Realizing the mere belief of the gap was an extremely effective funding tool, a series of similarly nonexistent Soviet advances were construed in a tactic now known as "policy by press release." These included claims of a nuclear-powered bomber, supersonic VTOL flying saucers, and only a few years later, the "missile gap."

The gap appears

On February 15, 1954, "Aviation Week" published an article describing new Soviet jet bombers capable of carrying a nuclear bomb to the United States from their bases in Russia. ["Pictures Reveal Reds' New "Sunday Punch", Aviation Week, 15 Feb. 1954, 12–13] The aircraft they referred to was the Myasishchev M-4 "Bison". Over the next year and a half these rumors were debated publicly in the press, and soon after in the United States Congress. ["Congress Gets Red Plane Facts", Aviation Week, 22 February 1954, pp. 13–14]

Adding to the clamor was an infamous event in July 1955. At the Soviet Aviation Day demonstrations at the Tushino Airfield, ten Bison bombers were flown past the reviewing stand, then flew out of sight, quickly turned around, and flew past the stands again. They repeated this six times, presenting the illusion that there were 60 aircraft in the flyby. [ [http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/bomber-intro.htm Soviet and Russian Bombers] , but other sources claim this took place during the May Day parade in Red Square] Western analysts extrapolated from the illusionary 60 aircraft, judging that it would take only a short time for the Soviets to produce 600.

At the time, the USAF had just introduced its own strategic jet bomber, the B-52 Stratofortress, and the shorter-range B-47 Stratojet was still suffering from a variety of technical problems that limited its availability. USAF staff started pressing for accelerated production of the B-52, but it also grudgingly accepted calls for expanded air defense. [ [http://www.dean-boys.com/551aew/navy_air_defence.htm Guarding the Cold War Ramparts: The U.S. Navy's Role in Continental Air Defense] ] The Air Force was generally critical of spending effort on defense, having studied the results of the World War II bombing campaigns and concluding that Stanley Baldwin's pre-war thinking on the fruitlessness of air defense was correct: the bomber almost always did get through. Like the British, they concluded that money would better be spent on making the offensive arm larger, deterring an attack. The result was a production series consisting of thousands of aircraft. Over 2,000 B-47s and almost 750 B-52s were built to match the imagined fleet of Soviet aircraft.

The gap disproven

President Dwight D. Eisenhower was skeptical of the gap from the start. With no evidence one way or the other, he agreed to the development of the Lockheed U-2 to answer the question once and for all. [ [http://www.coldwar.org/articles/50s/bomber_gap.asp Bomber Gap] ]

The first U-2 flights started in 1956. One early mission, Mission 2020 flown by Martin Knutson on July 4, 1956, [ [http://www.spyflight.co.uk/u2.htm Lockheed U-2 mission history] ] flew over Engels airfield near Saratov and photographed 20 Bison bombers on the ramp. Multiplying by the number of Soviet bomber bases, the intelligence suggested the Soviets were already well on their way to deploying hundreds of aircraft. Ironically, the U-2 had actually photographed the "entire" Bison fleet; there wasn't a single bomber at any of the other bases. [ [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-8/knutson2.html Interview with Martin Knutson] ] Similar missions over the next year finally demonstrated this beyond a doubt, and at least in official circles the gap disappeared.

As it was later learned, the M-4 was unable to meet its original range goals and was limited to about 8,000 km. Unlike the United States, at that time the Soviets lacked overseas bases in the Western Hemisphere and therefore the M-4 would not be able to attack the US and land at a friendly airbase. Interest in the M-4 waned, and a total of only 93 were produced before the assembly lines were shut down in 1963. The vast majority of these were used as tankers or maritime reconnaissance aircraft; only the original 10 shown at the air show and nine newer 3MD13 models served on nuclear alert. [ [http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/bomber/m-4.htm Myasishchev 'Bison'] ]

References in Popular Culture

- In Stanley Kubrick's Movie Dr Strangelove, the notion of a "bomber gap" is parodied when the character of Buck Turgidson (a Pentagon general) declares that the United States "cannot afford a mineshaft gap" when discussing the use of mineshafts as nuclear fallout shelters.

References