Basic belief

In foundationalism, basic beliefs (also commonly called foundational beliefs) are the axioms of a belief system.

Foundationalism holds that all beliefs must be justified in order to be believed. Beliefs therefore fall into two categories:
* Beliefs which are properly basic, in that they do not depend for their justification on other beliefs, but on something outside the realm of belief ("non-doxastic justification");
* Beliefs which are derivative of one or more basic beliefs, and therefore depend on the basic beliefs for their validity;

Within this basic framework of foundationalism, there are a number of views regarding which types of beliefs qualify as "properly" basic; that is, what sorts of beliefs can be justifiably held without the justification of other beliefs.

*In , beliefs are held to be properly basic if they are either self-evident axiom, or evident to the senses (empiricism). [Alvin Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, (London Notre Dame, 1983) pp 39-44. Here Plantinga is basing his analysis on the ideas of Aristotle and Aquinas.] However Anthony Kenny and others have argued that this is a self-refuting idea. [Anthony Kenny, "What is Faith?" Oxford: OUP 1992 ISBN 0192830678 pp 9-10. This particular chapter is based on a 1982 lecture which may explain the shift in the meaning of the term "foundationalism" since then.]
*In modern foundationalism, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they were either self-evident axiom or incorrigible. [Alvin Plantinga, pp 58-59. Here Plantinga references John Locke and René Descartes.] One such axiom is Rene Descartes's axiom, Cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"). Incorrigible (lit. "uncorrectable") beliefs are those which one can believe without possibly being wrong. Notably, the evidence of the senses is not seen as properly basic because, Descartes argued, all our sensory experience could be an illusion.
*In what Keith Lehrer has called "fallible foundationalism", [Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990). See also http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~howardd/onlehrererkenntnis.pdf] also known as "moderate foundationalism", the division between inferential and non-inferential belief is retained, but the requirement of incorrigibility is dropped. This, it is claimed, allows the senses to resume their traditional role as the basis of non-inferential belief despite their fallibility. ["It makes sense for people to believe what they perceive through their experience and therefore, individuals are justified in those beliefs. " [http://www.truthawakens.com/foundationalism.asp Truth Awakens on Foundationalism] ]
*In Reformed epistemology, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they are reasonable and consistent with a sensible world view. This rather broad criterion can include faith in our senses, faith in our memory, and faith in God.

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