Vlieter Incident

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Vlieter Incident
partof=War of the Second Coalition


date=August 30 1799
place=Den Helder, Netherlands
result=Batavian Surrender
combatant1=flagicon|United Kingdom|1606 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland;
flagicon|Russia Russia
combatant2=flagicon|Netherlands Batavian Republic
commander1=
commander2=
strength1=17 ships
strength2=13 ships
casualties1=none
casualties2=noneThe Vlieter incident was the surrender without a fight of a squadron of the navy of the Batavian Republic, commanded by Rear-Admiral Samuel Story, to the British navy in the roadstead known as "De Vlieter", near Den Helder, on August 30, 1799.

Background

During the War of the First Coalition the Dutch Republic was invaded in 1794 by the armies of the French Republic, which led to the flight of Stadtholder William V, Prince of Orange to England, and the proclamation of the Batavian Republic. This Republic now changed sides in the war, entering into an offensive and defensive alliance with France.

In the course of the War of the Second Coalition, which actually was a continuation of the first war, without France, Great Britain, or the Batavian Republic having concluded a peace, Great Britain and Russia decided to launch an invasion of the Batavian Republic in the peninsula of North Holland in August of 1799. It was hoped that this invasion would cause a popular rising of the Dutch population against their republic. The former Stadtholder and his eldest son the Hereditary Prince tried to support the expedition by propaganda-efforts and intrigues with disaffected officers. Especially the loyalty of the Batavian navy was in doubt, as this was a hotbed of Orangist sentiment. The British major-general G. Don, who conducted a reconnaissance of the Republic in July, 1799, estimated that the Helder squadron of the Batavian fleet would fall into British hands without a fight, if the Allies played their cards right [Roodhuyzen, p. 164] .

To accomplish this bloodless coup, the invading fleet came well stocked with flags of the previous regime, propaganda pamphlets, and Dutch émigrés, the most important of whom was the Hereditary Prince himself. On behalf of the Prince one of the Orangist officers who had left the Navy in 1795, Carel Hendrik Ver Huell, had contacted two of his former colleagues, Theodorus Frederik van Capellen and Aegidius van Braam (who had re-enlisted in the Batavian navy), with the object of getting them to organize a mutiny in the Helder squadron (where they each commanded a ship-of-the-line). However, it is not clear whether the two officers indeed made a determined organizational effort "before" the fatal day [Roodhuyzen, p. 164] .

On August 26, 1799 an Anglo-Russian [The squadron comprised at least two Russian ships: "Mitchiloff" (64) and "Ratzivan" (68); De Jonge, p. 468, fn. 1] invasion fleet of eleven ships-of-the-line and seven frigates arrived at the roadstead of Texel, flying the flag of the Prince of Orange. They started to disembark troops on the 27th, without opposition from the Batavian fleet, that had withdrawn into the Zuider Zee. The commander of the Batavian landforces, General Herman Willem Daendels then ordered the evacuation of the coastal forts of Den Helder.

Mutiny and surrender

On August 28, Admiral Story returned with his squadron to the Vlieter roadstead, where he anchored, because adverse winds made it impossible to attack the British. Enervated by the sight of the Orangist flags on the forts and church steeples of Den Helder, the crews of several of the ships then started to mutiny. Van Braam's ship "Leyden" was one of those. He later admitted that it would have been easy for him to quell the revolt, but he intentionally did nothing. Instead, he informed his commanding officer, Admiral Story (who himself had had to counter an incipient mutiny on the flag ship "Washington") of the "precarious situation" aboard the other ships of the fleet [Roodhuyzen, p. 166] .

Story now sent his flag captain, Van Capellen, and the captain of the "Cerberus", De Jong, under a flag of truce to the commander of the British squadron, Vice-Admiral Mitchell, to parley. They were to tell Mitchell that the Dutch fleet intended to give battle, in accordance with the explicit orders of the Agent for the Navy of the Batavian Republic, Jacobus Spoors, but that Story had asked for further orders, and proposed to await those. He asked for a temporary truce to avoid unnecessary bloodshed (Story later averred that this was a ruse on his part to gain time to restore discipline on his ships) [De Jonge, pp. 470-472] .

Mitchell did not fall for this ruse, probably because the two Dutch negotiators were actually the ringleaders of the mutiny [Roodhuyzen, pp. 165-166] . He issued an ultimatum that Story had to decide within one hour to join the invasion force (to defect to the Hereditary Prince, in other words) with his ships, or face the consequences. Faced with this ultimatum, Story convened a council of war aboard his flag ship with all his captains. According to Lt.-Colonel F. Maitland, who was present at the discussions on board "Washington", as a British parlimentaire, Van Capellen, De Jong, and Van Braam did their best to influence the council in the direction of accepting the ultimatum. He later asked in a letter to general Dundas that "...the opinions and sentiments expressed by the captains Van Capelle, Van Braam and the [sic] Jong generally in the presence of Admiral Story might not become public and those officers thereby endangered. To you in this letter, I apprehend I do right inform you, that above mentioned captains did declare their attachment to the Stadholder and the former government and their disgust at the present government and their French connections..." [Roodhuyzen, p. 166] .

Before this council started, the crew of the "Washington" had already begun a full mutiny, refusing to man the guns, and throwing munitions into the sea. Attempts of Story himself, and Van Braam to reason with the mutineers had been of no avail. When asked during the council of war to describe the situation aboard their ships all, except Captain Van Senden of "Batavier", had similar stories. In these circumstances it seemed impossible to engage in battle. Besides, the officers calculated that their continued resistance would contribute little to the fight against the invasion, as the disembarkation had already taken place. Scuttling the fleet seemed impossible, because the crews would not allow it. Finally, some calculated that it would be better to surrender without resistance, because in that case the ships would end up in the possession of the Stadtholder, instead of becoming war booty for the British [De Jonge, pp. 474-476] .

The council of war therefore unanimously decided to lower the flag of the Batavian Republic and declare themselves prisoners of war. They refused, however, to hoist the Orange flag. This may seem a minor point, but it signified that the officers did not defect. When Mitchell accepted the surrender, he did this in the name of the Hereditary Prince. He therefore ordered the flag of the Prince to be hoisted, with which order some of the officers complied. This little act was to cost them dearly later on, as it was interpreted as an act of treason [De Jonge, p. 477] .

Meanwhile, in the absence of the captains further acts of mutiny had taken place on the other ships. One officer was drowned; others loyal to the Batavian Republic were beaten up. The Batavian flag was torn up by the mutineers. British officers restored order with some difficulty. After the surrender the Prince visited several of the ships to receive the cheers of the mutineers [De Jonge, p. 478] . He had now hoped to take command of the surrendered fleet himself, but this was denied by the British. The crews were taken off the ships, and British prize crews sailed them to England. Only five derelict frigates lying in Den Helder were handed over to William. These were manned with volunteer crews of the old-regime Dutch navy, living in the vicinity, and under jury rig sailed to England in November. One of these frigates foundered with loss of life [Roodhuyzen, p. 169] .

Aftermath

After this initial success, the Anglo-Russian expedition soon ran into difficulties. The civilian population of North Holland did not display the fervor for the cause of Orange, that the Prince had expected. The Batavian army proved remarkably resilient and managed in cooperation with the French army of occupation to deal the Allies defeats at the Battle of Bergen and Battle of Castricum. The Allies therefore evacuated North Holland at the end of October, 1799.

As this was the second surrender of a Batavian fleet in short order (after the Saldanha Bay surrender of 1796), the authorities of the Batavian Republic decided to convene a court-martial (nl icon "Hoge Zeekrijgsraad") on October 8, 1799, to exact exemplary punishment of the officers responsible for the surrender, and of the mutineers. As these were away in England the trial had to wait till the first returned to the Netherlands on parole. Those were arrested. Only Story himself, Van Braam and Van Capellen remained outside the reach of the court. They were eventually tried "in absentia" [Roodhuyzen, p. 167] .

One captain, N. Connio, of the brig "Gier" was condemned to death, and executed on board the guard ship "Rozenburg" on December 27, 1799, to the consternation of the detained officers. Captain Kolff of the "Utrecht" was also condemned to death, but he managed to escape before his execution [Roodhuyzen, p. 167] .

Captain De Jong was acquitted of the charge of treason, for lack of evidence, but he was convicted of dereliction of duty. He was cashiered; had to undergo a symbolic simulated execution (whereby a sword was swung over his head), and was banished for life [Roodhuyzen, p. 167] . The trials were then suspended in hope that the absent officers would become available. In July 1801 the trial was resumed with new indictments against officers who had surrendered ships on earlier occasions or been otherwise derelict. Several other officers were punished in an attempt to make clear to the officer corps that surrender without a fight was unacceptable.

In June 1802 the "Hoge Zeekrijgsraad" was replaced by a permanent court, the "Hoge Militaire Vierschaar" (High Military Court). This court eventually conducted the trials of Story, Van Capellen, Van Braam, and Kolff in absentia, after it had become clear that these officers would not return to the Netherlands after the Peace of Amiens in 1802, when they were released as POWs.They were convicted of dereliction of duty, cowardice, and disloyalty. The court declared them perjurious (because they had broken their oath of loyalty), without honor and "infamous", and they were cashiered, and banished for life, on penalty of execution (by beheading in the case of Story; by death by firing squad in the case of the other three) [Archives "Hoge Militaire Rechtspraak 1795-1813", Dutch National Archives, inventory No. 95; 101 Sententiën] .

Story moved to Germany. He protested his innocence to the very end, publishing a public defense in the form of a book [Story, "passim"] . He died in Cleves in 1811, before he could ask the new King of the Netherlands for rehabilitation.

The others were more fortunate in this respect. They were fully rehabilitated after "their" party was restored to power in 1814. Van Capellen became a vice-admiral in the new Royal Netherlands Navy, and commanded a squadron at the Bombardment of Algiers in 1816.

Dutch ships surrendered

The squadron of Admiral Story comprised only part of the Batavian fleet. In Amsterdam lay four 74-gun and two 64-gun ships; at Hellevoetsluis one 74-gun ship and seven 64-guns, besides several frigates and brigs [James, p. 306] .

Text of the letter of capitulation of Admiral Story to Admiral Mitchell

"Neither your superiority, nor the threat that the spilling of human blood should be laid to my account, could prevent my shewing to you, to the last moment, what I could do for my sovereign, whom I acknowledge to be no other than the Batavian people and its representatives, when your prince's and the Orange flags have obtained their end. The traitors whom I commanded refused to fight; and nothing remains to me and my brave officers but vain rage and the dreadful reflection of our present situation: I therefore deliver over to you the fleet which I commanded. From this moment it is your obligation to provide for the safety of my officers and the few brave men who are on-board the Batavian ships, as I declare myself and my officers prisoners of war, and remain to be considered as such." [Otridge, p. 89]

References

ources

*aut|James, J.M. (2002) "The Naval History of Great Britain: During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Vol. 2 1797-1799", Stackpole Books, ISBN 081171005X
*nl icon aut|Jonge, J.C. de, and Jonge, J.K. de (1862) "Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche zeewezen", A.C. Kruseman
*aut|Otridge, W. "et al" (1801) "London Gazette Extraordinary. Admiralty-office, September 3 [, 1799] . Dispatches from vice-admiral Mitchell to Evan Nepean, esq., secretary of the Admiralty" in: "The Annual Register, Or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature for the Year 1799", pp. 86-90
*nl icon aut|Roodhuyzen, T. (1998) "In woelig vaarwater: marineofficieren in de jaren 1779-1802", De Bataafsche Leeuw, ISBN 9067074772
*nl iconaut|Story, S. (1805) "Verantwoording van Samuel Story, wegens zijn gehouden gedrag als commandant van 'slands esquader, voor, op, en na den 30. Augustus 1799, nevens zijne wederlegging van de op den 16. Januarij 1804 tegen hem uitgesprokene criminele sententie", Amsterdam, Johannes Allart