Dayton Agreement

"Dayton Treaty" redirects here. For the Native American treaty, see Treaty with the Kalapuya, etc..

Dayton Agreement
Seated from left to right: Slobodan Milošević, Alija Izetbegović, Franjo Tuđman signing the final peace agreement in Paris on December 14, 1995.
Created	December 14, 1995
Signatories	Slobodan Milošević, Alija Izetbegović, Franjo Tuđman
Purpose	Ended the Bosnian War

Bosnia and Herzegovina

This article is part of the series: Politics and government of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Constitution Dayton Agreement Peace Implementation Council High Representative Valentin Inzko Presidency Nebojša Radmanović (Chairman) Željko Komšić Bakir Izetbegović Cabinet Chairman Nikola Špirić Parliament House of Peoples House of Representatives Political parties Elections 2002 2006 2010 Foreign relations EU accession NATO accession Political divisions Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina President Živko Budimir Prime Minister Nermin Nikšić House of Representatives Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik Government Prime Minister Aleksandar Džombić National Assembly Speaker Igor Radojičić Brčko District

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The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Agreement, Dayton Accords, Paris Protocol or Dayton-Paris Agreement, is the peace agreement reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio in November 1995, and formally signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. These accords put an end to the three and a half year long war in Bosnia, one of the armed conflicts in the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

Negotiation and signature

Though the basic concepts of the Dayton Agreement began to appear in international talks since 1992,^[1] the negotiations were initiated following the unsuccessful previous peace efforts and arrangements, the August 1995 Croatian military Operation Storm and its aftermath, the government military offensive against the Republika Srpska, in concert with NATO's Operation Deliberate Force. During September and October 1995, many of the world powers (especially the USA and Russia), gathered in the Contact Group, applied intense pressure to the leaders of the three sides to attend the negotiations in Dayton, Ohio.

The conference took place from November 1 to November 21, 1995. The main participants from the region were Serbian President Slobodan Milošević (representing the Bosnian Serb interests due to absence of Karadžić), Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović with Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbey.

The peace conference was led by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and negotiator Richard Holbrooke with two Co-Chairmen in the form of EU Special Representative Carl Bildt and the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov. A key participant in the US delegation was General Wesley Clark (later to become NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in 1997). The UK military representative was Col Arundell David Leakey (later to become Commander of EUFOR in 2005). Paul Williams, through the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) served as legal counsel to the Bosnian Government delegation during the negotiations.

The secure site was chosen for several reasons: remove them from the luxury and media of Europe/Washington DC and to securely house over 800 staff and attendants. Curbing the participants' ability to negotiate via the media was also an important consideration. Richard Holbrooke wanted to stop the posturing and walls that can be built up due to early leaks to the press.

After having been initiated in Dayton, Ohio on November 21, 1995, the full and formal agreement was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995^[2] also by French President Jacques Chirac, U.S. President Bill Clinton, UK Prime Minister John Major, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Content of the agreement

The agreement's main purpose is to promote peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to endorse regional balance in and around the former Republic of Yugoslavia (art. V, annex 1-B), thus in a regional perspective.

The present political divisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its structure of government were agreed upon as part the constitution that makes up Annex 4 of the General Framework Agreement concluded at Dayton. A key component of this was the delineation of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, to which many of the tasks listed in the Annexes referred.

The State of Bosnia Herzegovina was set as of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Republika Srpska. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a complete state, as opposed to a confederation; no entity or entities could ever be separated from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although highly decentralised in its Entities, it would still retain a central government, with a rotating State Presidency, a central bank and a constitutional court.

The agreement mandated a wide range of international organizations to monitor, oversee, and implement components of the agreement. The NATO-led IFOR (Implementation Force) was responsible for implementing military aspects of the agreement and deployed on the 20th December 1995, taking over the forces of the UNPROFOR. The Office of the High Representative was charged with the task of civil implementation. The OSCE was charged with organising the first free elections in 1996.

Decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina

On 13 October 1997, the Croatian 1861 Law Party and the Bosnia-Herzegovina 1861 Law Party requested the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to annul several decisions and to confirm one decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, more importantly, to review the constitutionality of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since they alleged that the agreement violated the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a way that it undermined the integrity of the state and that it may cause the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court reached the conclusion that it is not competent to decide the disputes in regards to the mentioned decisions, since the applicants were not subjects that were identified in Article VI.3 (a) of the Constitution, in regard to those who can refer disputes to the Court. The Court also rejected the other request stating:

(...) the Constitutional Court is not competent to evaluate the constitutionality of the General Framework Agreement as the Constitutional Court has in fact been established under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to uphold this Constitution (...) The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted as Annex IV to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and consequently there cannot be a conflict or a possibility for controversy between this Agreement and the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.^[3]

This was one of the early cases in which the Court had to deal with the question of the legal nature of the Constitution. By making the remark in the manner of obiter dictum concerning the Annex IV (the Constitution) and the rest of the peace agreement, the Court actually "established the ground for legal unity"^[4] of the entire peace agreement, which further implied that all the annexes are in the hierarchical equality. In later decisions the Court confirmed this by using other annexes of the peace agreement as a direct base for the analysis and not only in the context of systematic interpretation of the Annex IV. However, since the Court rejected the presented request of the appellants, it did not go into details concerning the controversial questions of the legality of the process in which the new Constitution (Annex IV) came to power, and replaced the former Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court used the same reasoning to dismiss the similar claim in a later case.^[5]

Territorial changes

Before the Dayton agreement Bosnian Serbs controlled about 46% of Bosnia and Herzegovina (23,687 km²), Bosniaks 28% (14,505 km²) and Bosnian Croats 25% (12,937 km²).

Bosnian Serbs got large tracts of mountainous territories back (4% of Bosnian Croats and some small amounts from Bosniaks), but they were pressured to surrender Sarajevo and some vital Eastern Bosnian/Herzegovian positions. All in all by changing quality to quantity their percentage grew to 49% (48 if excluding the Brčko District, 24,526 km²) from a little bit more than 46% prior to Dayton.

Bosniaks got most of Sarajevo, and some important positions in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina while they lost only a few locations on mount Ozren and in western Bosnia. Their percentage grew from 28% prior to Dayton to 30% and they greatly upheld quality of the gotten land. Large tracts of prewar Bosniak (and Bosnian Croat) inhabited lands remained under Bosnian Serb Control.^[6]

Bosnian Croats gave most (4% of BiH territories) back to the Bosnian Serbs (9% of today's RS), and also retreated from Una-Sana canton as well Donji Vakuf (in Central Bosnia canton) municipality afterward. Small enlargement of Posavina canton (Odžak and parts of Domaljevac municipality) has not changed the fact that after Dayton Bosnian Croats controlled just 21% of Bosnia and Herzegovina (10,640 km²) especially when compared to more than 25% prior to Dayton. It is important to note that one of the most important Bosnian Croat territories (Posavina with Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Šamac, Derventa and Modriča) was still left out of Bosnian Croat control.

Control of Republika Srpska

• About 89.5%(22,059 km²) was under control of Bosnian Serbs
• About 9% (2,117 km²) of today's territories of Republika Srpska was controlled by Bosnian Croat forces; mainly in municipalities of, Šipovo, Petrovac, Istočni Drvar, Jezero, Kupres (RS) and part of Banja Luka municipality
• About 1.5% (350 km²) of today's territories of RS was controlled by Bosniak forces; mainly some villages in Ozren (Doboj and Petrovo municipalities), and western Bosnia (Krupa, and parts of Novi Grad and Oštra Luka municipalities)

Control of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

• About 53% (13,955 km²) of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was under Bosniak control
• About 41% (10,720 km²) of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was under Bosnian Croat control
• About 6% (1,435 km²) was under control of Bosnian Serbs

Cantons

Main article: Cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Canton 10:

• was almost completely under control of Bosnian Croats (4,924 km²)
• Bosniaks controlled some points east of Kupres (10 km²)

Una-Sana Canton:

• was almost completely under control of Bosniaks (3,925 km²)
• Bosnian Croats controlled some mountain passes on the southern parts of Bosanski Petrovac and Bihać municipalities (200 km²)

West Herzegovina Canton:

• was completely under Bosnian Croat control (1,362 km²)

Herzegovina-Neretva Canton:

• was divided, more than half was under Bosnian Croat control (2,525 km²)
• northern and central parts were under Bosniak control (1,666 km²)
• eastern mountains where under Bosnian Serb control (210 km²)

Central Bosnia Canton:

• was divided, a bit more than a third was under Bosnian Croat control (1,099 km²)
• rest was under control of Bosniaks (2,090 km²)

Zenica-Doboj Canton:

• was largely under Bosniak control (2,843 km²)
• there were some small enclaves like Žepče, Usora, Daštansko under Bosnian Croat control (400 km²)
• eastern mountains were under Bosnian Serb control (100 km²)

Tuzla Canton:

• was largely under Bosniak control (2,544 km²)
• there were some villages in Gradačac municipality under Bosnian Croat control (5 km²)
• and some villages in Doboj and Gračanica municipalities under Bosnian Serb control (100 km²)

Posavina Canton:

• was mostly under Bosnian Croat control (205 km²)
• Bosnian Serbs controlled Odžak and parts of Domaljevac municipalities (120 km²)

Bosnian Podrinje Canton:

• was mostly under Bosniak control (405 km²)
• Bosnian Serbs controlled areas which linked it with Sarajevo (100 km²)

Sarajevo Canton:

• was mostly under Bosnian Serbs control (800 km²)
• while Bosniaks controlled some southern suburbs and most of the city itself (477 km²)

Brčko District was divided;

• Bosniaks controlled most of its southern parts (200 km²)
• Bosnian Serbs its northern parts (193 km²)
• While Bosnian Croats controlled the rest, part near Orašje municipality and two enclaves on southern parts of municipality (100 km²)

Analysis and criticism

The immediate purpose of the agreement was to freeze the military confrontation, and prevent them at all costs from resuming. It was thefore defined as a "construction of necessity"^[7].

Despite this, the Dayton Agreement proved to be a highly flexible instrument, allowing Bosnia and Herzegovina to move from an early post-conflict phase through reconstruction and consolidation, passing from a consociationalist approach to a more integrationist one. Many scholars refers to it as "the most impressive example of conflict resolution"^[8]. Wolfgang Petritsch, OHR, has argued that the Dayton framework has allowed the international community to move "from statebuilding via institutions and capacity-building to identity building", putting Bosnia "on the road to Brussels"^[9]

Nevertheless, Dayton's three main shortcomings may be traced as to:

1. enabling international actors (such as the OHR), unaccountable to BiH's citizens, to shape the agenda of post-war transition, up to enacting punishment over local political actors^[10]
2. leaving each ethnic group discontent with the results: the Bosnian Serbs for the somehow limited results (although strongly favored in statistical terms), such as the arbitration over the Brcko district; the Bosniaks for ignoring the human rights issues such as the Srebrenica massacre and recognizing Serbian entities such as the Republika Srpska; the Bosnian Croats for the lack of equality, lacking a Croat Entity.^[11]
3. Dayton also violated the national sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by illegally changing the constitution of the Republic - one of civil democracy, into a new constitution which legalized genocide and allowed the genocidal parties to lay a claim on land that belonged to all citizens of RBIH not just a ethnic group. Making Dayton thus illegal under both national and international law.^[12]

According to University of Leipzig professor and Bosnian Academy of Sciences and Arts member Edin Šarčević, the current legal structure of the agreement does not abide by the basic principles of international law and the secular concept of national citizenship, making the Bosnian territorial and political situation continually unstable and fractious since its implementation in 1995.^[13]

See also

• Washington Agreement
• Serbia in the Yugoslav Wars
• Peace plans offered before and during the Bosnian War

References

1. ^ Munich All Over Again?, TIME Magazine, August 31, 1992
2. ^ "Dayton Peace Accords on Bosnia". USA State Department. 30 March 1996. http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html. Retrieved 19 March 2006. 
3. ^ Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, U-7/97, p. 2 and 3, Sarajevo, 22 December 1997
4. ^ Vehabović, Faris (2006). Odnos Ustava Bosne i Hercegovine i Evropske konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda. Sarajevo: ACIPS, 24. ISBN 9958-9187-0-6
5. ^ Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, U-1/03, Sarajevo, 25 July 2003.
6. ^ Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d3/BiH_territory_posession_just_before_Dayton.png
7. ^ Rory Keane, Reconstructing sovereignity. Post-Dayton Bosnia uncovered, London: Ashgate 2001, p.61
8. ^ Charles-Philippe David, "Alice in Wonderland meets Frankenstein: Constructivism, Realism and Peacebuilding in Bosnia", Contemporary Security Policy 22, No.1, 2001
9. ^ Wolfgang Petritsch, "My lessons learnt in Bosnia and Herzegovina", Sarajevo, 2006
10. ^ David Chandler, "From Dayton to Europe", International Peacekeeping 12, No.3, 2005, pp. 336
11. ^ Giulio Venneri, Modelling States from Brussels?, December 2007
12. ^ http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2766
13. ^ Ethnic Segregation as a Desirable Constitutional Position?, Bosnian Institute, 09 December 2008

External links

• Encyclopaedia Britannica, Dayton Accords - encyclopedia article written by President William Clinton
• The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
• The Dayton Agreements: A Breakthrough for Peace and Justice?, a Symposium at the European Journal of International Law
• Bosnia: a single country or an apple of discord?, Bosnian Institute, 12 May 2006
• Beyond Dayton: The Balkans and Euro-Atlantic Integration U.S. Institute of Peace Event, November 2005 (Audio & Transcripts)